Intelligence: tail waving a dog?

[Объединенное Детективное Бюро]

The intelligence apparatus for any intelligence is the most valuable resource and tool of intelligence activity. The success of any reconnaissance operation depends on the quality of the agent, its value and operational capabilities. In intelligence, recruitment operations against the most valuable candidates have been prepared for years, studying their nature, personal data, interests, worldview and gradually, step by step, forming the motivation for cooperation in the minds of candidates for recruitment.
A huge role here is played by the personal abilities of the agent-intelligence agent, his ability to establish business relations with agents and manage their activities. Practice shows that this quality is not given to everyone: a real agent should be born. The relationship of the scout and agent is a pure psychology based on mutual trust and mutual interest, the levels of which must be constantly maintained and monitored. Here, the operative is required not only contact and well-developed business communication skills, but also a deep knowledge of practical psychology: the ability to see, hear and empathize, and to do all this wholeheartedly.
The relationship between the scout and the agent will be strong only if both parties are interested in it, that is, if there is a partnership between them. To establish such relationships and maintain them for a long time is a great art. Partnership does not mean equality at all: each partner in the vertical “operative-agent” has its own role, responsibilities and measure of responsibility. Agent-based relationships based on the blind use of an agent as a means of achieving goals are usually short-lived and begin to fail at the most crucial moment: no one likes to use them openly. Many people who notice that they are being manipulated are able to hide their irritation for quite some time, until a convenient opportunity arises. Coercion to cooperate, organized on the basis of the collected dirt, also does not produce serious results, although it is sometimes necessary - as a necessary measure. Those who completely rely on incriminating evidence in their professional activities are at great risk: an agent who is forced to cooperate will seek any opportunity to take revenge on his offender. Often this happens when the materials collected on the agent lose their relevance or incriminating nature.
Despite the obvious progress of recent years in the field of technical espionage, the most valuable information is still being obtained from undercover sources. Using these same sources, the agent’s reliability is checked: not a single technical means of studying and monitoring the agent’s activity is able to notice those subtle and sometimes hardly distinguishable changes in his behavior, which in person communicate only in certain situations and are captured exclusively at the subconscious level. Meanwhile, these signs, at a certain frequency of their repetition, may indicate a change in motivation for cooperation or a desire to change the rules of the game.
The agent’s desire once to change the rules of the game lies in the very nature of agent relations and is always present in his thoughts, even among idealists. Any agent, especially one who has entered into cooperation out of mercenary motives, will eventually strive to free himself from agent dependence and become an independent figure in the ongoing game. Such attempts often end in success for the agent: many manage to figure out their curator and quietly play on his vulnerable character traits. In this case, with the relations being invariably external, the roles of both participants change, and after a while the operative, with great surprise for himself, may find that he, it turns out, has long been used for personal purposes. Or in the interests of a foreign state, which is much worse. That is why the key question in any undercover relationship is who actually controls whom: intelligence agent or intelligence agent? That is, the dog wags the tail or the tail wags the dog?
Particularly strong desire to change the rules of the game is manifested in big politics - among agents of influence, who finally got access to real power and financial flows. Over time, such an agent begins to believe that his career take-off is solely his personal merit, and not his overseas curators at all, because he is an outstanding personality and natural leader, “a favorite of the people,” who just temporarily took advantage of the help of foreign “fellow travelers”. He begins to believe that, since he already has power, he can refuse the services of foreign curators.
He also begins to think that, having gained power over an entire nation, he has become a large-caliber political figure, which not only needs to be reckoned with, but also harmonized with the rules of the ongoing big political game.
He becomes pathologically self-confident, believing that any of his actions will be justified thanks to guaranteed support from his real masters, and even actions that are not coordinated with them. He knows that, having brought him to power, his curators have put too much on him, and therefore will, until some point, cover up any of his actions taken to maintain and strengthen personal power. This allows him to use any means in the political struggle, including political killings (for example, as in the case of M. Saakashvili, the extremely clumsy masked murder of Prime Minister Z. Zhvania and the murder of B. Patarkatsishvili). By publicly justifying his actions or diverting the attention of the world community from them, his curators are forced to risk their reputation, resigned to the possibility of new, albeit small, but still very unpleasant (in a specific political context) spots appearing on it. As a result, a chain of incidents is built between the agent and its owners, which the agent seeks to use against its owners as an instrument of “soft” pressure, blackmail.
The more power is concentrated in his hands, the more he becomes burdened by his subordinate position in relation to the owners who brought him to power. If the motivation for his cooperation is self-serving, based on a thirst for power and money, then after coming to power in the country, he will have both of them. That is, the agent begins to believe that he has already received everything he wanted, and does not see the need to further "walk on a short leash" from his foreign owners.
All these changes in the agent’s consciousness and in the assessment of objective reality by him lead to the emergence of a steady desire of the agent to get out of control and rewrite from scratch the nature of his relationship with the owners. And you can even calculate in advance the time through which this will happen.
In such cases, the situation can be corrected only by the formation of new relations between the agent and its owners, and the bonds having the character of one-sided dependence. In the case of a rather rough game, these connections may be:
- In foreign policy: provoking an agent to organize a military adventure with guaranteed victims (or even genocide) among the civilian population, which is fully consistent with the concept of a war crime.
- In domestic politics: in relation to an agent, a tactical combination is carried out to nominate his successor, capable of replacing the current leader of the country, according to the same worked out scheme of the "velvet revolution". Thus, the agent is put in place, it is made clear to him that he is still only a pawn in the big game, if necessary, it is easy to replace him with another piece or donate at all.
It was this combination that was played by the United States with their protege Mikhail Saakashvili, who came to power as a result of the so-called “Rose Revolution,” a “soft” coup d'etat organized by American political strategists using American information and psychological effects on the mass consciousness of the civilian population and American money. Which Saakashvili immediately began to work out, exacerbating relations with Russia and constantly provoking her into the transition of interstate relations into a state of political confrontation. There is no doubt about the nature of M. Saakashvili’s relationship with US intelligence: this connection can only be of an agent nature.
It is quite easy to push such a leader as M. Saakashvili, who was brought to power in the country with the help of brainwashing technologies, into a military adventure. Moreover, at the initial stages of the preparation and implementation of the adventure, such an agent erodes the sense of personal responsibility and forms the collective sense of responsibility known in psychology, bordering on impunity, which is characteristic of the psychology of the crowd. However, having already gotten involved in an adventure and securing his personal participation in it with the shed blood of civilians, he suddenly finds himself in a situation where his participation in a war crime is undeniable for the whole world, and only a high patron, such as the United States, can save him from a criminal court. Moreover, he will remain unaccountable exactly until the moment when the patron supports him. From this you can eat more than one tie.
The psychological operation with a demonstration of intentions to replace M. Saakashvili was brilliantly conducted by Washington using another figure from his circle - I. Okruashvili, who was Saakashvili’s closest associate, who held various positions in his team, including the Minister of Defense. It is worth noting that I. Okruashvili never differed in character or belief from M. Saakashvili, they are similar as clones, including politically. Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from becoming the protagonist of the new “velvet revolution”, an exact copy of the “rose revolution”, which was developing so successfully according to the already developed scenario that in public opinion there was a firm conviction that I. Okruashvili would undoubtedly become the new leader of Georgia . However, this did not happen: the new “velvet revolution” was suddenly stopped, most likely by the command of the USA. Apparently, the transparent hint from Washington by the Georgian leader was understood correctly.
A political leader brought to power through the psychological technologies of “velvet revolutions” cannot stay on the wave of popularity for a long time: the romantic image of a new revolutionary and an unselfish fighter for the happiness of the people quickly disappears when this very people comes time to pay its debts and promises to foreign friends new leader of the country. Clones, as a rule, are not able to change anything in the economic situation of the country, and political populism over time loses its novelty and attractiveness due to endlessly repeated cliches and begins to cause irritation at first, and then contempt of the people. Therefore, the life time of such clones as M. Saakashvili or V. Yushchenko is limited; upon its expiration, the clone must be urgently changed to a new figure, because otherwise the population of the country can shift it by itself, organizing a spontaneous, unaccounted revolution. At the same time, the political technology of "velvet revolutions", as a result of which a clone appears whose romantic image temporarily hides its political inconsistency, allows you to periodically change the clones almost unlimited number of times, leaving the country under control.
Another example of a reconsideration of the nature of undercover relations is the loud attacks of pirate clans on ships in the Gulf of Aden (including the Faina transporting weapons) and the ensuing EU naval operation, code-named Atlanta.
Piracy in Somalia today has taken the form of a well-organized and streamlined business and has long been no longer random. To look for the cause of the current situation with piracy in the Gulf of Aden only in the social causes and internal problems of Somalia is a profound mistake. This is indicated by two key points: the transit of funds received as ransom for ships captured by pirates, cargo and, more recently, for members of ship’s teams, and the transit of certain categories of cargo that “disappear” from ships in the waters of the Gulf of Aden. If pirate raids are just a primitive robbery to enrich criminal clans in Somalia, raising funds to continue the civil war, then financial resources and cargo should go directly to Somali pirates and be spent domestically in the struggle for power and political influence. However, the picture that is observed in Somalia is completely opposite.
Firstly, the money for the purchase of ships and cargo does not go to the leaders of the pirate gangs, but is transferred to closed accounts to intermediaries - the so-called “elders” of clan and tribal clans who are influential in a pirate environment, constantly live in Europe, Saudi Arabia, Oman or the United States, geographically separated from their homeland (that is, they do not personally participate in robbery operations), but at the same time keep in touch with their fellow tribesmen and are always up to date. Financial resources for the purchase of ships, cargo and hostages in pirate operations are always received by a third non-resident party, with which, according to Western political standards, "you can have a civilized business." What part of these funds and through what channels then goes to the direct executors of the pirate raids (and whether it arrives at all) is unknown. It is possible that in this financial scheme, pirate services are paid from other monetary funds, and the money received as a ransom has a different purpose and other destinations.
Secondly, not all cargo that disappears from ships as a result of pirate raids then pops up in Somalia. This is especially true for weapons, and weapons intended for waging an offensive war. The Ukrainian Faina transport, loaded with tanks and anti-aircraft systems, is not the first ship with heavy army weapons captured by Somali pirates. In the conditions of the civil war in Somalia, tanks and anti-aircraft systems are ineffective, so it is not surprising that not a single tank missing from ships in this area was then used by Somali field commanders in combat clashes with rivals. This means that all armaments were shipped to other consumers outside the country, and moreover they were smuggled in an organized manner. The incident with the capture of the Faina vessel unexpectedly illuminated part of the links of this weapon transit channel, and even then by chance. It turns out that Somali pirates purposefully hunt for large batches of weapons and military equipment that cannot be realized inside Somalia and useless in a civil war. So the pirates are fulfilling someone's order?
Somalia’s ambassador to Russia M. Handula described the situation as follows: “There is a suspicion that pirates are nothing more than mercenaries. Well received a ransom of a million dollars, and what will they do with it? Most likely, from this they are paid some kind of interest, “salary”. Who pays, the question is open. But the fact that someone gives them tips, let’s say, this ship can be robbed, there is such and such cargo, but this ship is not standing, it’s obvious. Note that no one is touching ships with Somali cargo. Our clans are able to protect their own "[1].
All this allows us to consider Somalia and maritime communications in the Gulf of Aden as an intermediate point in the transit of weapons in one direction and financial means in the other, and piracy itself - as a phenomenon that provides these transit operations with a logical explanation and an ideal cover legend. Moreover, it seems that piracy in Somalia is a mediation in the political game of the larger world leaders.
It should be noted that in the fight against Somali pirates, the leading world powers and the international community as a whole are surprisingly helpless. So, on December 8, 2008, off the coast of Somalia, the largest naval operation in the history of the fight against Somali pirates began - Operation Atlanta. Warships of the countries of the European Union took part in it: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece. The results of this operation are not encouraging: escort of merchant ships with warships did not lead to a noticeable decrease in the statistics of pirate raids and the activity of pirates as a whole. Chasing Somali pirates with squadrons of warships is like shooting a gun at sparrows.
The pirates reacted to the start of the operation in a mocking manner. Their representative said on the radio that the territory they control is equal in area to Europe, and it is simply impossible to block it with six ships.
It turns out that the Atlanta operation basically did not achieve its goals. Or these goals were originally different, and the "active phase of the fight against pirates" was a beautiful cover legend.
Let us consider, as an assumption, the version that piracy off the coast of Somalia is a streamlined channel for the transit of weapons and money to areas of international conflict. That is, Somali pirates are political mercenaries controlled from abroad.
Today in the world, all the constantly operating channels of hidden transit of weapons and finances in especially large amounts are under the control of world leaders, each of which uses these channels in accordance with its own interests. Such a channel for the transfer of weapons and money, like the pirate business in Somalia, is beyond the control of any of the Somali clans, or even any of their alliances. It is unlikely that any of the largest structures of international crime is able to control such a channel - the interests of too many influential forces of international proportions intersect in this sphere and in this geographical point of the globe. Most likely, one of the world leaders (maybe even the USA) really has the most direct relation to the organization of this transit channel. In any case, it was precisely the Ukrainian weapons, 34 T-72 tanks, multiple-launch rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems that were found on the Faina transport, and the Georgian leadership so needed to make up for its losses caused by the war in South Ossetia.
At the same time, it is well known that after some time any of the mercenary agents tries to get out of the control of their masters, to free themselves from the external dependence that agent relations impose on him. In this case, the agent must be put in place on time, return to him the correct understanding of reality and a sober assessment of the balance of forces. This requires a demonstration.
If we assume that the pirate business in Somalia is a channel for the transit of weapons and finance, then the capture of Faina by pirates is a clear violation of the rules of conspiracy, an action that practically revealed the mechanism and volumes of illegal arms transit to the world community. Such a failure of an arms transfer operation can happen only in one case - if its performers, namely one of the pirate clans, decide to get out of control of their masters and declare themselves to be an independent force.
That is why, probably, one of the goals of the Atlanta operation is to make it clear to the heads of the pirate clans that they are nothing more than pawns in the world political game. So that they do not build illusions about their independence and continue to follow those rules
games that were installed for them.
Posted by: Andrey Manoilo

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[Матушкин Андрей Николаевич]

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