Operational intelligence

[Объединенное Детективное Бюро]

Operational intelligence.

Almost all of the Russian special forces operating in the area of the counter-terrorist operation or carrying out anti-terrorist and intelligence activities operate on the basis of data received from FSB operatives. Probably border guards, GRU officers, and special forces of the internal troops will probably agree with me: in comparison with other sources, the information coming from the FSB operas is the most accurate. But how is its collection going? What is the work of the FSB based on? In many ways, this will remain a mystery to the layman. We can only slightly outline individual methods and talk about the main means of such work.

To begin with, in each region of the country, in each region and in each city, there is a department or department of the FSB. The basis of such units are operational workers.
“It’s impossible to say exactly where the work of an operative begins,” explains Major Dmitry Tolstyko, FSB FSB officer. - There is a concept - operational-search activity. And it is ongoing: work is underway with the population, information resources, confidents, and analytical studies are being conducted.
According to the investigators, even the item “poll of citizens” is not reduced in their work to a banal conversation. For the success of these events, FSB officers must have good memory, analytical thinking, the ability to quickly compare facts and draw conclusions. There are two types of operational survey. In the first case, the Chekist does not hide who he is, but behaves in such a way that the interviewee does not know what they specifically want from him. In the second, the operative pretends to be another person who does not interest anyone in criminal activity.
“I will give one example,” says Major Tolstyko. - In the area of Nozhai-Yurt, a gang of militants was operating. It was necessary for us to identify its main and spare places of rest, strength, driving routes, weapons, and ties with local residents. Analysts, basing themselves on information about clashes and terrorist attacks carried out by bandits, as well as on the basis of data provided by internal troops operating in the area, compiled a map of possible places where militants could meet with local residents. Several mountain villages were selected. Employees began a population survey. Since agent networks were still weak at that time, the main emphasis was placed on work, as they say, on their own. We selected several divisions of the Ministry of Defense, stationed in the area we need, agreed with their command, changed into uniform. Then they began to establish relations with the population. Each time, different reasons for communication were chosen. In one of the villages an elderly woman managed to talk.
- The dishes? Go into the third house, I have not had time to remove Zalima yet.
We went into the third house on the street. There a woman washes dishes thirty. Near dirty pots and pans. We walked the day before and did not seem to see any holiday, there were no gatherings either. Four people live in the house. So the guests were nocturnal. We politely told the owners about the legal consequences that await them for harboring bandits. After an hour of conversation, the owners repented, indicated where the gang had gone, talked about the ringleader’s connections with the local population and other houses where the militants were visiting.
The same work was done in neighboring villages. After that, the information was transferred to the special forces of the internal troops, which targeted the destruction of all gangs.
Field investigators say that during the survey, special attention should be paid to the facial expressions and behavior of the respondent. If a person is lying, then, as a rule, looks into the eyes of the interlocutor no more than a third of the time of conversation. If the interviewee, on the contrary, looks closely at the employee, and the pupils are dilated, this may mean that he considers the conversation necessary, and the likelihood of fraud is reduced. Although close attention may indicate hostility, in such situations, the pupils of the interviewee are narrowed. People who tend to rub their eyelids, pull off the shirt collar, cover their mouth with their hands from time to time, but do not yawn while hiding their hands in their pockets, are inclined to deceive or want to not tell the whole truth. Even the habit of smoking can tell a lot to the operative. A person who is confident in his words and actions exhales smoke up or in front of himself. Fussy and cowardly people, those who are overcome by gloomy thoughts or who are going to do something wrong, direct the smoke down.
One of the methods of working with citizens is observation. Integrated observation, combining physical, visual and technical, is most often used in the work of employees and agents. Personal or physical monitoring is carried out using cameras and video cameras. Voice recorders, listening devices, navigation beacons are also honored by field investigators. Young field investigators, before starting their work, learn how to get lost in the crowd and not stand out from the mainstream. The quick, almost instantaneous change in appearance with the help of glasses, wigs, changing clothes has become almost an art in the Bodies. But, alas, the subtleties and secrets of it can not be revealed.
An important role in operational activities is played by work with confidants. Some citizens (and the Caucasus are no exception) are willing to voluntarily cooperate with the authorities. However, they do not always convey objective information, and sometimes even specify the neighbors. On Lubyanka there are photographs of the 37-38 years of the last century, which clearly show how thousandths of people lined up in the morning to the mailboxes “for denunciations”. If all the information was taken into account then, probably, today there would be no one to live in our country. Therefore, data from voluntary assistants is very carefully checked.
Another group of agents is “victims”. People who have been offended or infringed by the representatives of the criminal world are not clean officials and so on. But the work with such people is complicated by the fact that everyone around knows how these citizens are disposed towards certain representatives of the criminal world. And therefore, with rare exceptions, an abundance of information cannot be expected from them.
Another category of citizens is “sinners”. For these people there is a sin in front of the Bodies or, conversely, before the criminal world, in the publicity of which they are not interested. How these sins are established, information is classified. But such data is always used in the right direction. These citizens are not inclined to simple slander and libel, they are carriers of accurate information. To meet with them, certain places (appearances) are assigned. It can be a grove where the confidential leaves information, or even a roadside toilet. Routes and places are determined in such a way as not to arouse suspicion among local residents. Creating your own intelligence network is a priority for FSB operatives. In every microdistrict of Moscow, in every city, village, aul, there are people who constantly supply the authorities with the necessary information every day.
A separate type of work for operatives is control delivery and purchase, so that you can identify traitors, establish the identity of buyers of weapons, and much more.
“In my lifetime,” says Dmitry Tolstyko, “there were two serious operations related to the control supply and purchase. In the first case, we received information from an agent that an officer of one of the units was selling weapons and ammunition. To begin with, we found out the circle of his communication, how he legally writes off the sold, who covers it. Then our agent expressed interest in acquiring the machine. We detained the officer in the act, while all participants in the arms trade were detained. After that, people who bought weapons were also identified.
The second case occurred in the suburbs, it seems to me that it is more interesting. During a survey of citizens, we learned about a certain person who is interested in buying weapons. Through an agent network they established his identity and set up an observation. Tracked his negotiations. It turned out that a Russian citizen was actively buying up weapons from servicemen who arrived from hot spots. He supplied weapons to a large criminal group. Our employee met with him and offered a large batch of sniper weapons, equipment and anti-personnel mines. One of the leaders of the criminal structure arrived at the meeting. Having examined the samples of mines and weapons, he made an appointment in a neutral place. A consignment of “goods” was handed over to the bandits. Naturally, by this time all members of the organized criminal group were being monitored. As a result, we learned the places of their warehouses, communications in the criminal world, identified people who collaborated with bandits. The gang was captured that evening.
The implementation of the KGB officers stands apart. It is organized in exceptional cases when the intelligence network is not able to provide the necessary information and evidence base, when there is no time to carry out the whole complex of operational measures, and in a number of other cases.
“Sometimes for this kind of activity there are not enough ten months allotted by the authorities,” the operatives explain. - Moreover, the operational implementation of FSB officers is often very different from what everyone remembers from the film “The meeting place cannot be changed.”
Employees are forced to commit unlawful acts and even “contract killings”. Of course, operatives do not kill anyone, but fake requisites for blood, traces of shots, explosions are spent a lot. The officers are convinced that it is impossible to list all forms of activity during implementation.
“It's like artists,” FSB officers say, “a new role - a new attribute, a new image.”

 

[Матушкин Андрей Николаевич]

Thank!