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One of the distinctive features of the eastern state is the presence of a powerful and all-encompassing police apparatus. For many decades, the ruling Arab regimes have been supported by armies and special services. In the Arab countries, there are two types of secret services ("mukhabarat") — "civilian" and "military". Each performs its own tasks. The only thing that they "have in common" is a dense veil of secrecy.
Military intelligence services collect information of a military nature abroad. The security services ("civilian") are primarily concerned with the protection of the existing regime in the country. However, in recent years, they have significantly expanded the scope of their activities and are engaged not only in internal problems. If necessary, they conduct operations outside the country in order to" neutralize " the opponents of the regime. The main task of the "civilian" intelligence services is to gain the full confidence of the political leadership, which would allow them to take control of military intelligence and dominate the intelligence community of the country.
Since the creation of the Arab secret services, they were primarily intended to combat the opposition, operating both inside and outside the country. But over time, they turned into real national security agencies. This phenomenon is the result of constant efforts to maintain the balance (or neutralize) the various centers of power on which the regime rests. It is appropriate to emphasize that the "civilian" secret services in Arab countries have traditionally focused on domestic issues. Moreover, before the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Arab countries did not have their own foreign intelligence.
This tradition is partly explained by the nature of the Arab special services, which are not only an instrument of supporting regimes and ensuring national security, but also an instrument of influence on the political life of these states. Not surprisingly, when the former head of the secret service begins to engage in political activities, it is often difficult for him to clearly define the dividing line between the old and new functions and avoid the influence of one on the other. By the way, the officers of the Arab special services quite often ascend to the political Olympus. For example, in Egypt, after the 1952 revolution, about 20 of them became ministers, and some, like Mamdouh Salem, became prime ministers.
The danger posed by internal opposition and external enemies forces the Arab secret services to spend a significant part of their time and effort on counterintelligence activities. The coups and revolutions that have rocked the Middle East have forced counterintelligence leaders to constantly identify elements that threaten the regimes.
The "Mukhabarat" of Arab countries opposes the clandestine activities of the domestic opposition and foreign intelligence services. To this end, counterintelligence performs defensive and offensive functions. The first aspect is security. The second is counterintelligence.
The main task of counterintelligence is to prevent the enemy (both inside and outside the country) from harming national interests, infiltrating state structures and gaining access to secret documents. A variety of means are used to do this: vetting candidates for government posts, official or secret censorship, and monitoring various circles and groups in which any underground anti-government activities may be carried out. Intelligence officers or agents are infiltrated into these structures in order to collect information, identify persons who pose a threat to the regime.
EGYPT
In Egypt, the leading role is played by the "civilian" intelligence services. It is not surprising that in 1967 and 1970, the leaders of these special services were involved in plots against the regime. Their military intelligence colleagues not only remained loyal to the government, but also demonstrated their support for the authorities.
Egyptian special services include: "Mukhabarat al-Amma" (General Intelligence Service), "Mukhabarat al-Harbiya" (Military Intelligence), "Mukhabarat al-Dawla" (General Directorate of State Security Investigations), "Jigaz Amn al-Dawla" (State Security Service).
The General Intelligence Service (SOR) has been headed by Omar Suleiman al-Rifai for many years. He was born in 1938. He has a law degree. He has been the head of the SOR since 1991. Until 2000, the disclosure of any information about him was prohibited by the Egyptian state censorship. He is one of the most influential figures in the entourage of President Hosni Mubarak. He is responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as supervises the security of the president and top officials of the state. Israeli and American experts attribute to him the main merit in neutralizing the armed Islamic opposition. He oversees the most important political and economic issues, including relations with other countries, as well as all relations with Libya and Iran. He often acts as President Mubarak's personal representative in negotiations with Israel, the United States and Arab countries. Pays great attention to the activities of the General Intelligence Service of Saudi Arabia in Egypt and beyond. He considers Riyadh one of the main geopolitical and regional rivals of Cairo.
Since the mid-90s, he has been in charge of the Israeli-Palestinian direction of Egyptian foreign policy. In January 1997, he was one of the initiators of the creation of the semi-state public association "Cairo-for Peace", which until the fall of 2000 advocated the development of relations with Israel in the economic and scientific fields. In 2000-2001, he repeatedly acted as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority in order to put an end to armed clashes in the Palestinian territories. Since December 2000, it has served as the main communication channel between Egypt and Israel. Since May 2002, he has been engaged in reforming the power structures of the PNA. Maintains relations with the heads of most of the Middle East's intelligence agencies, as well as close ties with the head of the CIA.
According to the Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN), he has a pragmatic mindset. Initiative, but at the same time proved to be an excellent performer. Laconic, characterized by emotional stability, composure and restraint. One of his main traits is his complete loyalty to the president. AMAN's experts, who specialize in Egypt, describe the man as a top - class espionage ace.
Almost the same thing can be heard from those few Israeli politicians from the entourage of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who personally know the head of the Egyptian SOR and agreed to tell at least something about this person. It should be noted that after one of the meetings with Omar Suleiman, former Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin (Fuad) Ben-Eliezer said:"This is one of the most serious people I have ever met."
In recent years, Omar Suleiman has concentrated much more power and authority in his hands than other Egyptian government officials, as well as his colleagues in neighboring Arab countries. The structure headed by him has the broadest powers, far beyond the scope of direct intelligence activities.
Today, this special service is not only responsible not only for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, but also ensures the personal security of the president and top officials of the state, and at the same time oversees important political and economic issues both in the country and abroad. Therefore, it is not surprising that the man at the head of such a powerful organization is one of the figures closest to President Mubarak.
By the way, the house where the head of the SOR lives with his large family, located in the prestigious area of the Egyptian capital Heliopolis, is almost a stone's throw from the apartments of the president himself. According to the level of trust that the Egyptian leader has in Omar Suleiman, only three other people can compare with the chief of the SOR: Propaganda Minister Safuat al-Sharif, political adviser to the President Osama el-Baz and director of the presidential office Zachariah Azmi.
The best period of relations between the special services of Egypt and the USSR falls on the late 60s-early 70s. After the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt, who sought to gradually change the political orientation from pro-Soviet to pro-American.
In September 1994, the President of the Russian Federation signed Decree No. 492 "On the conclusion of an Agreement between the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the General Intelligence Service of the Arab Republic of Egypt on cooperation".
In recent years, the Egyptian media have increasingly begun to appear messages containing information about the work of the SOR and its head. According to experts, there is a targeted PR campaign, the purpose of which is to "promote" the most likely successor to the current president of Egypt. And representatives of the Western and Israeli intelligence services have repeatedly stated that at present, the most likely to take the presidential chair is the powerful head of the SOR, Omar Suleiman al-Rifai.
As for Israel, in his attitude to the Jewish state, as the Israeli expert on the special services Mikhail Falkov emphasizes, Suleiman Rifai, as in other matters of foreign policy, is guided solely by considerations of practical expediency and does not share the hysterical and patriotic views of many Egyptian politicians who take an extremely anti-Israeli position. After the beginning of the "Al-Aqsa intifada", he made every effort to achieve a truce between the conflicting parties.
After Ariel Sharon came to power, Suleiman Rifai made several secret visits to Israel, where he met with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, as well as with the leadership of the Israeli special services. According to one senior Israeli official, "the ties with this man are of paramount strategic importance for the Jewish state and the situation in the entire Middle East region."
Today, Suleiman Rifai has significantly strengthened contacts with the CIA and the General Intelligence Service of Jordan.
SYRIA
In such a delicate matter as the security services, Syria has always relied on the help of more senior colleagues. Bashar al-Assad, who headed the country in 2000 after the death of his father, did not change the tradition.
This tradition of searching for a "teacher" is more than half a century old. And the first in this role were specialists from the SS. It is believed that the" father " of the Syrian special services was Alois Brunner, who was sentenced to death three times by a French court. According to some sources, until October 1991, he lived in the Syrian capital and only later he was transported to the port city of Latakia. Rumor has it that he died there in 1996.
The second "teacher" for the special services of Syria was Egypt. In February 1958, the two countries merged under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR). As such, Syria existed until 1961.
Before the creation of the UAR, the special services of Syria included the Second Bureau (within the army), the General Security Directorate (in the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the General Intelligence Directorate.
As a result of the merger with Egypt, the Second Bureau came under the control of the Egyptian military Intelligence, the Directorate of General Security became a division of the Directorate of Secret Services of Egypt, and the Directorate of General Intelligence was renamed the Special Bureau, which was supposed to carry out the most sensitive operations. For example, this structure inherited from the Second Bureau of the Palestinian "Fedayeen" (translated from Arabic — "sacrificing themselves"), which were engaged in both collecting information and conducting acts of sabotage or terrorist attacks on Israeli territory.
Naturally, almost simultaneously with the Egyptians, Soviet military advisers appeared in Syria. However, it is unlikely that the Russian support is very interested in Syria today. The young president is seeking help from two superpowers-the United States and China. And in this, Syria is not hindered even by the plume of a terrorist sponsor.
Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1971 to 2000, greatly strengthened the country's police and security services. Currently, the State's political police is the Internal Security Service. However, counterintelligence is not only engaged in this structure.
There is evidence that by 1987, the internal security apparatus consisted of a huge number of organizations with overlapping functions, since other special services also had their own internal security departments. At the same time, each organization reported directly to the President and his closest advisers. These organizations operated completely independently of each other and had not quite clearly defined boundaries of their powers.
In early 2000, General Assef Shawkat, the husband of President Bashar al — Assad's older sister, took over the internal security service. Today, he is considered perhaps the most influential Syrian security official. Shaukat was born in 1950 in the city of Tartus. He comes from a simple Alawite family. In 1968, he entered the law faculty of the State University, and also became a member of the ruling Ba'ath party. From 1972 to 1976, he continued his studies at the same university at the Faculty of History. The topic of his doctoral dissertation is the Great Syrian Uprising of 1925.
In 1978, he entered the Higher Military Academy. In 1983, he received the rank of officer. In the mid-80s, Shawkat was a simple officer of the ground forces of the Syrian army. In the late ' 80s, he met President Hafez al-Assad's only daughter, Bushra, who was ten years younger than him and at the time was finishing her studies at the Faculty of Pharmacology at the University of Damascus.
The family didn't like their daughter's choice. Only Bashar, the current president, sided with Shaukat. With his support, Shaukat officially married Bushra after divorcing his first wife in 1995.
His only son-in-law was promoted to the rank of Major General. After that, Bashar became very close to Assef, and then-President Hafez al-Assad even appointed him as his son's security adviser. It was Shaukat who initiated a series of purges in the government, army and party apparatus.
Not everyone in the presidential family was happy with this elevation. In 1999, President Assad's third son, Maher, even shot Shaukat in the palace. But this did not prevent his son-in-law's career. First, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Military Intelligence Service, and in early 2000, he became head of the Internal Security Service.
There are four special services in Syria. All of them are directly under the control of the President and have overlapping functions. So the mode does not depend on any of them. At the same time, within each service, the heads of various departments are often directly subordinate to the president, and not to their nominal director.
The Department of Political Security (UPB) is engaged in identifying signs and traces of organized political activity directed against the interests of the existing regime. Its functions include monitoring and supervising dissidents, as well as the activities of foreigners in the country and their contacts with local residents. The UPB also controls printed publications and audio and video products.
The General Directorate of Security (GUB) is the main civilian intelligence service in Syria. It is divided into three departments. The Department of Internal Security is responsible for the supervision of the population of the country (a duty that intersects with the UPB). The head of the internal security of the country is a political adviser to Bashar al-Assad. The other two departments of the GUB are engaged in the implementation of external security (like the CIA). These are the Department of Palestinian Affairs, which oversees the activities of Palestinian groups in Syria and Lebanon, and the Department of External Security.
Military intelligence. Formally, it is responsible for the usual range of military operations. However, the service also provides military and logistical assistance to Palestinians, Lebanese, and Turkish extremist groups. According to Western media, it monitors and often organizes terrorist attacks against dissidents abroad.
Air Reconnaissance Force (VRS). Despite the name, this service is not only engaged in its direct duties. One of the commanders of the Syrian air force was once Hafez al-Assad. When he came to power, he focused on this special service. As a result, for about 30 years, this service was commanded by a trusted adviser to the President, Major General Mohammed Al-Howli.
Within the country, the VRS often oversaw special operations against Islamic opposition elements. For example, they played a major role in the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist sect that rebelled in the 1970s and early 1980s. In December 1999, the VRS conducted a nationwide hunt for members of the Islamic liberal party Hizb al-Tahrir.
It is believed that it is the VRS that oversees Syria's support for international terrorism. According to Western media, agents of this special service abroad in the Syrian embassies and branches of the Syrian National Airlines company coordinated dozens of terrorist attacks. The most famous is the attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner at London's Heathrow Airport in April 1986.
LEBANON
Lebanon has three official state intelligence services — Amn al-Amn (General Directorate of General Security), Amn al-Dawla (Directorate of State Security) and Mukhabarat Armi (Military Intelligence). Plus the Ministry of the Interior, the gendarmerie, and the internal security forces that perform police functions. Outwardly, this is such a logical and simple scheme that it resembles the structure of the law enforcement agencies of some European country.
Even the scandals in which the Lebanese security services are involved are very similar to those in Europe. For example, in 1999, the country's Minister of Posts and Communications, Issam Nuaman, admitted that the special services had tapped the phones of high-ranking government and political figures. An investigation by the Interior Ministry and the relevant parliamentary committee revealed that the practice of wiretapping began as early as 1948. As soon as this was revealed, the country's parliamentary commission immediately sent a draft law on the legalization of wiretapping to the government for approval.
However, this is only an appearance. Even the principle of appointment to the post of director of intelligence has nothing to do with the way it is done in Europe. For example, Lebanon is a multi-religious state, where Christians (both Catholics and Orthodox) and Muslims (Shiites, Sunnis and Druze) live. As a result, the country has the principle of confessional representation in government structures. The President is a Christian, the Prime Minister is a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament is a Shiite. The same principle of distribution of positions applies to the special services.
However, in addition to religion, there is also the party principle of the distribution of portfolios. The Amal Party, in the recent past the same militant terrorist organization as Hezbollah, has now settled down, integrated into the state system of power and dissolved its own special services. In return, Amal was able to appoint its own people to the leadership of the state special services.
However, this is not all. Lebanon has been the site of the Arab war with Israel for too long to completely rid itself of the protectorate of its stronger neighbors. While Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanon in 2000, Syria, whose military contingent has been in the country since April 1976, did so only recently.
Southern Lebanon exists under the rule of the Shiite radical group Hezbollah, which in turn has its own intelligence, counterintelligence and security service. They are supervised by the famous "terrorist No. 2" Imad Mughniyeh, nicknamed "Hyena".
He began his career in the Joint Security Directorate of the Palestinian Fatah under the leadership of one of Yasser Arafat's closest associates, Salah Khalaf, and in the mid-80s moved to the operational department of Hezbollah. His duties included conducting intelligence, sabotage and terrorist operations outside Lebanon with the help of Iranian intelligence. It was he who oversaw the hostage-taking of two employees of the Soviet embassy, Oleg Spirin and Arkady Katkov, an employee of the trade mission, Valery Myrikov, and the embassy doctor, Nikolai Svirsky, in 1985.
Relations between State intelligence agencies and Hezbollah colleagues are not an internal matter in Lebanon. As a result of the trilateral agreements between Lebanon, Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has been given free rein in Southern Lebanon, as the group bears the brunt of the war with Israel. As a result, every conflict that may arise between the country's authorities and Hezbollah will have an international rather than an internal character.
Do not forget that in the territory of Southern Lebanon there is still a contingent of the IRGC-the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. Therefore, at the moment, Hezbollah is inviolable.
On February 14, former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was assassinated in Lebanon. The country's opposition is inclined to blame the Lebanese and Syrian special services for this tragedy. Shortly after the assassination, all the leaders of the Lebanese security services were removed from their posts. The head of military intelligence, Raymond Azar, left the country with his wife and children and settled in Paris.
JORDAN
In Jordan, "civilian" intelligence services dominate military intelligence. Although the army is the mainstay of the regime, it nevertheless poses a potential threat to the royal family. In many of the plots that took place in Jordan, the military has always been the main actors.
The Jordan General Intelligence Service (SORA) ("Mukhabarat al-Amma") was established in 1964 by a decision of the State Parliament. Its first leader was Mohammed Rasool al-Geylani. He came from a noble family and graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Damascus. According to the weekly Version, al-Geylani began his career in the military prosecutor's office, then served in the army intelligence service and in 1964 was appointed head of the Mukhabarat al-Amma . In this position, he showed particular zeal in the fight against Palestinian terrorist organizations, for which he was dismissed in 1968. In 1973-1974, he again headed the SOR.
The Mukhabarat al-Amma is the kingdom's most powerful intelligence agency and ensures the stability of the Hashemite regime. At the same time, the SOR performs the functions of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. It monitors the activities of foreign intelligence services, terrorist and opposition organizations, as well as other anti-state phenomena.
Usually, the head of the Mukhabarat al-Amma is appointed by a high-ranking army officer who reports to the Prime Minister and is a personal adviser to the King. The selection of new employees is based on their intellectual performance, background and loyalty to the regime.
In addition to the highly professional staff, SOR has a modern technical base. Thanks to this, over the years of its existence, the General Intelligence Service has established itself as a very effective special service. It controls almost all spheres of social and political life in the country.
The Mukhabarat al-Amma also has virtually unlimited powers. Within Jordan, the SOR has a large network of agents. In the past, the SOR has given priority to Palestinian organizations. In the last decade, Islamist groups have taken their place.
The headquarters is divided into several departments. The most important is the Department of Internal Security. It specializes in Islamist and Palestinian organizations, and controls all religious institutions, the opposition, the student movement, and refugee camps. Important elements of the SOR are the Intelligence Directorate for Arab Countries, the Research Directorate, the Propaganda Department, etc. The SOR also provides security for Jordanian embassies abroad and guards important government facilities inside the country.
The headquarters of the General Intelligence Service is located in Amman. Its regional offices also operate in the cities of Al-Zarqa, Irbid, Jarash, Es-Salt, Madaba, Al-Mafraq, Aqaba, Ma'an, Tafilah and Qarah.
Since the accession to the Jordanian throne of King Abdullah II, according to experts of the website " Agency. Ru", has lost the influence on Israeli-Palestinian relations that his late father had. Today, at the regional level, it is unquestionably inferior to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Its position in the West Bank and especially in East Jerusalem has also weakened significantly.
Under King Hussein, the Hashemite throne had considerable influence on religious life in the area and was even considered the guardian of Muslim shrines. Now almost no one remembers it. However, the main test of Abdallah has yet to be overcome. The most serious threat to his regime lies in Jordan itself. The recent terrorist attacks are evidence of this...
It is appropriate to recall that in Jordan, the organized opposition to the regime is represented by various Islamist groups, of which there are more than a dozen in the kingdom. Many of them are closely associated with their associates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This primarily concerns the branch of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun ("Association of Muslim Brothers"), Hamas and a number of groups" Al-Jihad al-Islami "("Islamic Jihad"). Their main backbone is made up of Palestinians.
At the same time, the majority of the Palestinian community in Jordan (more than 60% of the population) traditionally adheres to opposition sentiments. Almost all the terrorist attacks that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom since its formation have also been the work of Palestinians.
Thus, it is clear that the ruling elite from the very beginning perceived the "Al-Aqsa intifada" as a real threat to the stability of the regime. At the same time, King Abdullah had to constantly maneuver between "Arab unity", the sentiments of "his" Palestinians, on the one hand, and the objective geopolitical and economic interests of the monarchy, on the other.
No less paradoxical is the attitude of Amman towards the question of an independent Palestinian State. At all official conferences, forums, meetings, etc., the Jordanian representatives strongly supported its creation. However, in secret talks with the Americans and Israelis, they expressed fears that an "independent Palestine" would have a destabilizing effect on Jordan. Most of all, the ruling elite of the country is afraid of the transition of the Jordan Valley under the jurisdiction of "Palestine". In such a scenario, this area (until 1967, it was under the control of Amman) could turn into a springboard for the Jordanian opposition.
Before the start of the al-Aqsa intifada, the General Intelligence Service was led by Sami al-Batihi, who was quite successful in his duties. However, the new situation in the region required a new approach to the activities of the Jordanian intelligence. So King Abdullah decided to replace Batihi with the younger Saad Hir.
SAUDI ARABIA
For the past thirty years, the security services of this Arab state have been involved in the most important world events for various reasons. They were given a major role in the organization of the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan in the 80s, in the 90s they were very close to the Taliban movement, at the end of the last century, the Saudi General Intelligence Service (SOR) was increasingly mentioned as a central player in the organization of the export of Arab mercenaries, including to Chechnya.
The General Intelligence Service of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (SOR KSA) — in Arabic, "Istikhbarat al-Amma".
With its control of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and nearly a quarter of the world's oil reserves, Riyadh is aggressively claiming leadership in the Muslim world. The implementation of its geopolitical ambitions is largely facilitated by the internal stability of the royal family regime. It relies on three main forces: members of the ruling clan, the Wahhabi clergy, and a powerful security system. The latter includes the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Intelligence and counterintelligence services, as well as the National Guard. They are joined by the Faisal bin Turki Special Forces Brigade No. 1, which occupies a privileged position in the armed forces.
SOR is one of the most secret intelligence services in the Islamic world. It was created in the second half of the 50s a little later than the rest of the security structures of the kingdom. CIA instructors played an important role in its formation and training.
At the initial stage, the main task of the SDF was to neutralize the subversive activities of the Arab States, especially Iraq and Egypt, aimed at overthrowing the monarchy and supporting the left-wing opposition. The primary focus was on Cairo — the main opponent of Riyadh in the intra-Arab arena.
Since the mid-60s, the SOR has been providing assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood, which represented the main opposition to President Nasser. In the future, cooperation with this organization and the more radical groups that broke away from it became a priority for Saudi intelligence. Turki al-Faisal, who headed it in 1976, significantly improved the mechanism of interaction with the Islamist movement. On his initiative and with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, the service became the main means of covert Saudi influence at the international level. By the way, the sharp rise in prices on the world oil market that appeared in the early 70s created extremely favorable conditions for this, since a significant part of the income received was allocated to the needs of exploration. It also financed dozens of Islamist organizations of a religious-educational and military-political nature in the countries of Asia and Africa. Their secret ties with the Global leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, and through it their dependence on the SOR, allowed Riyadh to effectively influence the situation in these regions.
In the mid-70s, the intelligence service of Saudi Arabia significantly strengthens cooperation with the special services of the United States and France. Together with them, the SOR develops a global doctrine to neutralize the Soviet presence in Muslim countries. To this end, in 1976, the so-called Safari Club was formed, which included the intelligence services of Riyadh, Tehran, Cairo and Rabat. The activities of this alliance are funded by Saudi Arabia. In many regions of Asia and Africa, it aims to create or support Islamic organizations that represent an alternative to pro-Soviet liberation movements or regimes associated with the USSR. So, together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia supports the Islamic opposition of South Yemen, and together with Morocco-the Angolan group UNITA.
As a counterweight to the Soviet influence on a number of PLO factions, the leadership of Syria, Libya and Algeria, with the help of other members of the Safari Club, begins to provide assistance to their internal opponents, the Islamists. In 1978, after the revolution in Afghanistan, Turki al-Faisal establishes a similar cooperation with the chief of the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI), Geylani Khan. It was aimed at supporting not only the Islamic opposition in Afghanistan, but also Islamist groups in India, a strategic ally of the USSR in South Asia.
At the turn of the 70s — 80s, the SOR changes its tactics. It is not without the participation of Turki al-Faisal's adviser on Muslim issues in the USSR, the ethnic Uzbek Khoja Jamshid, that Saudi intelligence moves to operations directly against the Soviet Union. The first step in this direction was the creation in 1978 of the International Organization for Free Press and Information, headquartered in Cairo.
A few years later, with the participation of the" Safari Club "(which by that time had left the Iranian intelligence service), the organization" Maktab al-Khidmat " was created, responsible for mobilizing volunteers for the war in Afghanistan. Its main patrons are the Turks al-Faisal and William Casey, who headed the CIA in January 1981. They were also the authors of the global sabotage against Moscow, based on the manipulation of prices on the world oil market, so it was planned to undermine the Soviet economy.
To destabilize the internal political situation in the USSR, the SOR and the CIA are developing a plan to support the Islamic underground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For its implementation, a variety of structures are involved, from the "harmless" Summer Linguistic Institute to the "Hezb-i Islami" Hekmatyar. By the way, at that time the SOR had its agents even in the Soviet capital. They were Arab students who studied at universities in Moscow and belonged to the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the first half of the 90s, the SOR, along with the ISI, was one of the founders of the Taliban movement and until the beginning of 2002 maintained fairly close contacts with it (including through the Saudi Ambassador in Islamabad). The SOR has been equally active through various structures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and with the support of the ISI in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Muslim regions of Russia. According to some sources, Saudi diplomats were also used in this case, in particular, the head of the Islamic department of the embassy in Moscow, Suleiman al-Moghoshi, and Consul Abdullah al-Hamidi.
In 2001, the SOR significantly reduced the scope of its activities in Russia. In August of the same year, exactly 11 days before the terrorist attacks in the United States, Turki al-Faisal left his post, and in July 2002, his new position was announced — the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in London. Instead, the SOR was headed by Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz, who appointed Lieutenant-General Mahmud bin-Muhammad Bakhsh as his deputy for the operational part.
Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz is the twentieth son of the founder of the modern Saudi Kingdom, Abd al-Aziz, and the brother of Crown Prince Abdullah. Born in 1934. He began his career as the governor of Riyadh. Then he headed the Ministry of Finance, and in 1970-the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the same year, he became a member of the so-called Sudairi Seven, which determines the internal and foreign policy of the kingdom.
Since the beginning of the 90s, he has been paying great attention to the development of relations with Muslim countries, in particular with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Iran and Palestine. He heads the "Al-Aqsa Intifada Humanitarian Aid Commission", which supports the Palestinian Islamist movement. In March 2002, on the eve of the 14th Arab League summit, he suffered a stroke. He was admitted to the American University Hospital in Beirut. Now Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz has fully returned to active work.
This year, Saudi Arabia established a financial intelligence service to combat the financing of terrorism. According to experts, the creation of such intelligence (it will collect, analyze financial information and share it with foreign colleagues to track and combat money laundering and terrorist sponsorship) is a crucial step that demonstrates the kingdom's commitment to combating money laundering and terrorism. So far, such units are only available in four Arab States: Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
ALGERIA
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, who was elected in 1999, reshuffled the army's top command in February 2000, replacing the commanders of four of the six military districts and changing the command of the National Gendarmerie, the Navy, the Republican Guard and the General Staff of the Army. He promoted graduates of Soviet and French military universities to key positions. The same line was drawn in the special services.
Today, the Algerian intelligence community includes the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, the Directorate of Internal Security, the Directorate of Documentation and Security, the Special Security Service, the Counterinsurgency Coordination Command, and the Special Forces.
In June 2002, a new Cabinet of Ministers of Algeria was formed, in which the post of Minister of the Interior was taken by the patriarch of the Algerian special services, 64-year-old Nuriddin Yazid Zerhouni. He began his career in 1956 in the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and took an active part in the resistance to the French colonial authorities. In the 60s and 70s, he was one of the key figures in the country's intelligence community. Its activity spread both to the nearby countries of the Maghreb and the Arab East, and to remote areas of the African continent. At the same time, Zerhouni established close ties with representatives of the special services of Egypt, Cuba and Germany.
Shadli Benjedid, who came to power in 1979, regarded Zerhuni as a dangerous rival, and therefore in 1982 sent him as an ambassador to distant Mexico. From 1987 to 1992, he headed the Algerian Embassy in the United States. After returning to his homeland, Zerhuni retired. However, seven years later, the new President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, called him back into service. Zerhuni became one of three ministers who moved from the old government cabinet to the new one. His main task as chief of the Interior Ministry is to fight against radical Islamic groups and develop ties with the special services of the Maghreb, the Middle East and Europe.
Over the past twenty years, the Algerian security services have been subjected to repeated and often completely meaningless reforms. They were constantly merged, renamed, and re-divided. Of course, this process was also influenced by the large-scale and generally rather unsuccessful fight against Islamic extremists. In 1993, it led Algeria to a civil war, numerous terrorist attacks, and the murder of foreign tourists and diplomats.
TUNISIA
Tunisia gained independence in 1956. In March of the same year, elections to the National Assembly were held. Habib Bourguiba formed his first government.
On July 25, 1957, the republic was proclaimed. Bourguiba was elected President. On November 7, 1987, he was deposed. On this day, at 7.30 am, the voice of Tunisian Prime Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben-Ali was heard from the loudspeakers, announcing the overthrow of Bugriba and the appointment of himself as President of Tunisia. According to the official version, by this act, Ben-Ali thwarted the threat of a putsch prepared by the fundamentalists and scheduled for the morning of November 8. Ben-Ali remains the country's president today.
In 2002, the Tunisian security services intensified their activities in international and regional organizations in the context of the fight against international terrorism. President Ben-Ali has put at the forefront the task of eliminating conditions for the resuscitation of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, which can destabilize the internal political situation in the country. According to the Tunisian leadership, religious fanaticism is the main potential threat to the stability and security of the country. Tunisia has acceded to 11 of the 12 universal conventions on cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
On 23 July 2003, the Minister of the Interior and Local Development, Hedy Mhenni, told Parliament that in six months of 2003, the Tunisian security services had managed to prevent 66 attempts of illegal emigration from Tunisia to European countries by sea. At the same time, the minister said, of the 1,329 detainees, 70% were citizens from neighboring African states and Asian countries.
The Tunisian special services also solve internal problems. They are aimed at exercising tight control over the Islamist opposition inside and outside the country, suppressing any manifestations of the emergence of any political organizations on a religious basis, preventing the penetration of extremist groups, weapons, explosives, counterfeit banknotes and drugs into the country, detaining and extraditing criminals and suspects of committing dangerous crimes.
Thanks to cooperation with the special services of European (Belgium, Italy) and Arab (Algeria) countries, the Tunisian law enforcement agencies managed to uncover the affiliation of 34 Tunisians to the Islamist terrorist group "Ahl al-Jamaa wa-s-Sunna", which operated in Italy as a structural link in the network of providing and recruiting mercenaries for Al-Qaeda.
Contacts between the special services of Tunisia and Belgium are continuing to search for individuals who were part of the so-called "Tunisian Islamic Militant Group" linked to Al-Qaeda. According to intelligence officials, two members of this group, posing as journalists, in September 2001, committed the murder of the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud.
Today, the Tunisian intelligence community includes the Ministry of the Interior and Local Development; the Directorate of State Security; the Gendarmerie; and special bodies under the Ministry of Defense.
MOROCCO
In 1999, King Hassan II died suddenly. The vacant throne was taken by his 35-year-old son, Sidi Mohamed (Mohammed VI, or, as the Moroccans call him, "M6").
First of all, the new king replaced the chief of the Counterintelligence Service, appointing Colonel Hamida Laanigri to this post. He also dismissed the former king's all-powerful Interior Minister Driss Basri, replacing him with Ahmed Midawi. The monarch also created a new post of Secretary of State for the Interior, appointing a personal friend of the new Interior Minister, Fouad Ali el-Himma.
According to Andrei Soldatov, an expert on the special services, two secret meetings of representatives of the special services and the Foreign Ministry of Morocco with their Israeli counterparts took place several years ago at the King's initiative. During the talks, the sides discussed the resumption of bilateral cooperation in the field of security, in particular in the fight against Islamist organizations, as well as the prospect of intensifying Rabat's mediation efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The initiative to resume dialogue with Israel, which was interrupted as a result of the Al-Aqsa intifada, also belonged to Mohammed VI. At the same time, the cooperation of the Moroccan special services with the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence Service of Saudi Arabia has significantly intensified.
LIBYA
Today, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has two special services at his disposal. These are the military intelligence Service (Istikhbarat al-Askariya) and the Secret Organization of the Jamahiriya (Hayat Amn al-Jamahiriya) — the Libyan equivalent of the KGB.
Since December 2002, the military intelligence service has been headed by Abdullah Sanoussi. The secret organization of the Jamahiriya is headed by Musa Kusa, who is in the rank of Deputy Foreign Minister, who distinguished himself in the Lockerbie case. In addition, Musa Kusa heads the so-called Anti-Imperialist Center, which is used to support terrorists. The second person in the Secret Organization is Suleiman Ashiri.
Internal security is headed by the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Mohammed Ali al-Misrati.
The functions of maintaining order are carried out by the security battalions ("Kataib al-Amn») They are located in all major Libyan cities.
Gaddafi does not hesitate to place people who are accused of terrorism in European countries in key positions in the special services. For example, in 1999, Abdallah Sanoussi was sentenced in absentia to life in hard labor in France for organizing an explosion on board a civilian airliner DS-10. But this did not prevent the Libyan leader from appointing him chief of military intelligence, especially since he had previously led the Secret Organization of the Jamahiriya.
QATAR
Three structures are responsible for ensuring State security in Qatar: the Investigation Police ("Mukhabarat"), the State Security Investigation Department ("Mabahis") and the Military Intelligence Service ("Mukhabarat al-Askariya").
The Investigation Police is part of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of the State Security Investigation Department is to combat espionage. The main task of military intelligence is to ensure the security of the armed forces of Qatar. It is also responsible for combating terrorism and political dissidents.
Qatari law provides only two scenarios for those accused of espionage: the death penalty or a full acquittal.
Qatar's special services maintain fairly close contacts with the Israeli intelligence community.
For almost 60 years, Israel has remained the main target of the interests of the Arab secret services. They are interested in the structures of various parties, the alignment of political forces in the country, government plans, the armed forces, military doctrine, the economy, cooperation with foreign states, relations with the Jewish diaspora, Zionist organizations, etc.
No less interesting than the "Zionist enemy" for the Arab intelligence services are... the Arab states. This is part of what is called the "Arab Cold war," which has often turned into a "hot war" — in Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria. The efforts made by some Arab secret services to overthrow the regime in the "brotherly" country have never weakened and even surpassed the activity directed against Israel.
One of the main sources of information for the Arab intelligence services is the flow of messages published by foreign media. But this information is clearly not enough. Therefore, the Mukhabarat, in an effort to raise intelligence gathering to a higher level, create "bases" abroad, sometimes far from the Middle East. These "bases" not only allow you to identify agents working for Israel, but also provide an opportunity to obtain information about both the Jewish state and the Arab countries.
Military intelligence services collect information of a military nature abroad. The security services ("civilian") are primarily concerned with the protection of the existing regime in the country. However, in recent years, they have significantly expanded the scope of their activities and are engaged not only in internal problems. If necessary, they conduct operations outside the country in order to" neutralize " the opponents of the regime. The main task of the "civilian" intelligence services is to gain the full confidence of the political leadership, which would allow them to take control of military intelligence and dominate the intelligence community of the country.
Since the creation of the Arab secret services, they were primarily intended to combat the opposition, operating both inside and outside the country. But over time, they turned into real national security agencies. This phenomenon is the result of constant efforts to maintain the balance (or neutralize) the various centers of power on which the regime rests. It is appropriate to emphasize that the "civilian" secret services in Arab countries have traditionally focused on domestic issues. Moreover, before the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Arab countries did not have their own foreign intelligence.
This tradition is partly explained by the nature of the Arab special services, which are not only an instrument of supporting regimes and ensuring national security, but also an instrument of influence on the political life of these states. Not surprisingly, when the former head of the secret service begins to engage in political activities, it is often difficult for him to clearly define the dividing line between the old and new functions and avoid the influence of one on the other. By the way, the officers of the Arab special services quite often ascend to the political Olympus. For example, in Egypt, after the 1952 revolution, about 20 of them became ministers, and some, like Mamdouh Salem, became prime ministers.
The danger posed by internal opposition and external enemies forces the Arab secret services to spend a significant part of their time and effort on counterintelligence activities. The coups and revolutions that have rocked the Middle East have forced counterintelligence leaders to constantly identify elements that threaten the regimes.
The "Mukhabarat" of Arab countries opposes the clandestine activities of the domestic opposition and foreign intelligence services. To this end, counterintelligence performs defensive and offensive functions. The first aspect is security. The second is counterintelligence.
The main task of counterintelligence is to prevent the enemy (both inside and outside the country) from harming national interests, infiltrating state structures and gaining access to secret documents. A variety of means are used to do this: vetting candidates for government posts, official or secret censorship, and monitoring various circles and groups in which any underground anti-government activities may be carried out. Intelligence officers or agents are infiltrated into these structures in order to collect information, identify persons who pose a threat to the regime.
EGYPT
In Egypt, the leading role is played by the "civilian" intelligence services. It is not surprising that in 1967 and 1970, the leaders of these special services were involved in plots against the regime. Their military intelligence colleagues not only remained loyal to the government, but also demonstrated their support for the authorities.
Egyptian special services include: "Mukhabarat al-Amma" (General Intelligence Service), "Mukhabarat al-Harbiya" (Military Intelligence), "Mukhabarat al-Dawla" (General Directorate of State Security Investigations), "Jigaz Amn al-Dawla" (State Security Service).
The General Intelligence Service (SOR) has been headed by Omar Suleiman al-Rifai for many years. He was born in 1938. He has a law degree. He has been the head of the SOR since 1991. Until 2000, the disclosure of any information about him was prohibited by the Egyptian state censorship. He is one of the most influential figures in the entourage of President Hosni Mubarak. He is responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as supervises the security of the president and top officials of the state. Israeli and American experts attribute to him the main merit in neutralizing the armed Islamic opposition. He oversees the most important political and economic issues, including relations with other countries, as well as all relations with Libya and Iran. He often acts as President Mubarak's personal representative in negotiations with Israel, the United States and Arab countries. Pays great attention to the activities of the General Intelligence Service of Saudi Arabia in Egypt and beyond. He considers Riyadh one of the main geopolitical and regional rivals of Cairo.
Since the mid-90s, he has been in charge of the Israeli-Palestinian direction of Egyptian foreign policy. In January 1997, he was one of the initiators of the creation of the semi-state public association "Cairo-for Peace", which until the fall of 2000 advocated the development of relations with Israel in the economic and scientific fields. In 2000-2001, he repeatedly acted as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority in order to put an end to armed clashes in the Palestinian territories. Since December 2000, it has served as the main communication channel between Egypt and Israel. Since May 2002, he has been engaged in reforming the power structures of the PNA. Maintains relations with the heads of most of the Middle East's intelligence agencies, as well as close ties with the head of the CIA.
According to the Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN), he has a pragmatic mindset. Initiative, but at the same time proved to be an excellent performer. Laconic, characterized by emotional stability, composure and restraint. One of his main traits is his complete loyalty to the president. AMAN's experts, who specialize in Egypt, describe the man as a top - class espionage ace.
Almost the same thing can be heard from those few Israeli politicians from the entourage of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who personally know the head of the Egyptian SOR and agreed to tell at least something about this person. It should be noted that after one of the meetings with Omar Suleiman, former Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin (Fuad) Ben-Eliezer said:"This is one of the most serious people I have ever met."
In recent years, Omar Suleiman has concentrated much more power and authority in his hands than other Egyptian government officials, as well as his colleagues in neighboring Arab countries. The structure headed by him has the broadest powers, far beyond the scope of direct intelligence activities.
Today, this special service is not only responsible not only for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, but also ensures the personal security of the president and top officials of the state, and at the same time oversees important political and economic issues both in the country and abroad. Therefore, it is not surprising that the man at the head of such a powerful organization is one of the figures closest to President Mubarak.
By the way, the house where the head of the SOR lives with his large family, located in the prestigious area of the Egyptian capital Heliopolis, is almost a stone's throw from the apartments of the president himself. According to the level of trust that the Egyptian leader has in Omar Suleiman, only three other people can compare with the chief of the SOR: Propaganda Minister Safuat al-Sharif, political adviser to the President Osama el-Baz and director of the presidential office Zachariah Azmi.
The best period of relations between the special services of Egypt and the USSR falls on the late 60s-early 70s. After the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt, who sought to gradually change the political orientation from pro-Soviet to pro-American.
In September 1994, the President of the Russian Federation signed Decree No. 492 "On the conclusion of an Agreement between the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the General Intelligence Service of the Arab Republic of Egypt on cooperation".
In recent years, the Egyptian media have increasingly begun to appear messages containing information about the work of the SOR and its head. According to experts, there is a targeted PR campaign, the purpose of which is to "promote" the most likely successor to the current president of Egypt. And representatives of the Western and Israeli intelligence services have repeatedly stated that at present, the most likely to take the presidential chair is the powerful head of the SOR, Omar Suleiman al-Rifai.
As for Israel, in his attitude to the Jewish state, as the Israeli expert on the special services Mikhail Falkov emphasizes, Suleiman Rifai, as in other matters of foreign policy, is guided solely by considerations of practical expediency and does not share the hysterical and patriotic views of many Egyptian politicians who take an extremely anti-Israeli position. After the beginning of the "Al-Aqsa intifada", he made every effort to achieve a truce between the conflicting parties.
After Ariel Sharon came to power, Suleiman Rifai made several secret visits to Israel, where he met with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, as well as with the leadership of the Israeli special services. According to one senior Israeli official, "the ties with this man are of paramount strategic importance for the Jewish state and the situation in the entire Middle East region."
Today, Suleiman Rifai has significantly strengthened contacts with the CIA and the General Intelligence Service of Jordan.
SYRIA
In such a delicate matter as the security services, Syria has always relied on the help of more senior colleagues. Bashar al-Assad, who headed the country in 2000 after the death of his father, did not change the tradition.
This tradition of searching for a "teacher" is more than half a century old. And the first in this role were specialists from the SS. It is believed that the" father " of the Syrian special services was Alois Brunner, who was sentenced to death three times by a French court. According to some sources, until October 1991, he lived in the Syrian capital and only later he was transported to the port city of Latakia. Rumor has it that he died there in 1996.
The second "teacher" for the special services of Syria was Egypt. In February 1958, the two countries merged under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR). As such, Syria existed until 1961.
Before the creation of the UAR, the special services of Syria included the Second Bureau (within the army), the General Security Directorate (in the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the General Intelligence Directorate.
As a result of the merger with Egypt, the Second Bureau came under the control of the Egyptian military Intelligence, the Directorate of General Security became a division of the Directorate of Secret Services of Egypt, and the Directorate of General Intelligence was renamed the Special Bureau, which was supposed to carry out the most sensitive operations. For example, this structure inherited from the Second Bureau of the Palestinian "Fedayeen" (translated from Arabic — "sacrificing themselves"), which were engaged in both collecting information and conducting acts of sabotage or terrorist attacks on Israeli territory.
Naturally, almost simultaneously with the Egyptians, Soviet military advisers appeared in Syria. However, it is unlikely that the Russian support is very interested in Syria today. The young president is seeking help from two superpowers-the United States and China. And in this, Syria is not hindered even by the plume of a terrorist sponsor.
Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1971 to 2000, greatly strengthened the country's police and security services. Currently, the State's political police is the Internal Security Service. However, counterintelligence is not only engaged in this structure.
There is evidence that by 1987, the internal security apparatus consisted of a huge number of organizations with overlapping functions, since other special services also had their own internal security departments. At the same time, each organization reported directly to the President and his closest advisers. These organizations operated completely independently of each other and had not quite clearly defined boundaries of their powers.
In early 2000, General Assef Shawkat, the husband of President Bashar al — Assad's older sister, took over the internal security service. Today, he is considered perhaps the most influential Syrian security official. Shaukat was born in 1950 in the city of Tartus. He comes from a simple Alawite family. In 1968, he entered the law faculty of the State University, and also became a member of the ruling Ba'ath party. From 1972 to 1976, he continued his studies at the same university at the Faculty of History. The topic of his doctoral dissertation is the Great Syrian Uprising of 1925.
In 1978, he entered the Higher Military Academy. In 1983, he received the rank of officer. In the mid-80s, Shawkat was a simple officer of the ground forces of the Syrian army. In the late ' 80s, he met President Hafez al-Assad's only daughter, Bushra, who was ten years younger than him and at the time was finishing her studies at the Faculty of Pharmacology at the University of Damascus.
The family didn't like their daughter's choice. Only Bashar, the current president, sided with Shaukat. With his support, Shaukat officially married Bushra after divorcing his first wife in 1995.
His only son-in-law was promoted to the rank of Major General. After that, Bashar became very close to Assef, and then-President Hafez al-Assad even appointed him as his son's security adviser. It was Shaukat who initiated a series of purges in the government, army and party apparatus.
Not everyone in the presidential family was happy with this elevation. In 1999, President Assad's third son, Maher, even shot Shaukat in the palace. But this did not prevent his son-in-law's career. First, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Military Intelligence Service, and in early 2000, he became head of the Internal Security Service.
There are four special services in Syria. All of them are directly under the control of the President and have overlapping functions. So the mode does not depend on any of them. At the same time, within each service, the heads of various departments are often directly subordinate to the president, and not to their nominal director.
The Department of Political Security (UPB) is engaged in identifying signs and traces of organized political activity directed against the interests of the existing regime. Its functions include monitoring and supervising dissidents, as well as the activities of foreigners in the country and their contacts with local residents. The UPB also controls printed publications and audio and video products.
The General Directorate of Security (GUB) is the main civilian intelligence service in Syria. It is divided into three departments. The Department of Internal Security is responsible for the supervision of the population of the country (a duty that intersects with the UPB). The head of the internal security of the country is a political adviser to Bashar al-Assad. The other two departments of the GUB are engaged in the implementation of external security (like the CIA). These are the Department of Palestinian Affairs, which oversees the activities of Palestinian groups in Syria and Lebanon, and the Department of External Security.
Military intelligence. Formally, it is responsible for the usual range of military operations. However, the service also provides military and logistical assistance to Palestinians, Lebanese, and Turkish extremist groups. According to Western media, it monitors and often organizes terrorist attacks against dissidents abroad.
Air Reconnaissance Force (VRS). Despite the name, this service is not only engaged in its direct duties. One of the commanders of the Syrian air force was once Hafez al-Assad. When he came to power, he focused on this special service. As a result, for about 30 years, this service was commanded by a trusted adviser to the President, Major General Mohammed Al-Howli.
Within the country, the VRS often oversaw special operations against Islamic opposition elements. For example, they played a major role in the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist sect that rebelled in the 1970s and early 1980s. In December 1999, the VRS conducted a nationwide hunt for members of the Islamic liberal party Hizb al-Tahrir.
It is believed that it is the VRS that oversees Syria's support for international terrorism. According to Western media, agents of this special service abroad in the Syrian embassies and branches of the Syrian National Airlines company coordinated dozens of terrorist attacks. The most famous is the attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner at London's Heathrow Airport in April 1986.
LEBANON
Lebanon has three official state intelligence services — Amn al-Amn (General Directorate of General Security), Amn al-Dawla (Directorate of State Security) and Mukhabarat Armi (Military Intelligence). Plus the Ministry of the Interior, the gendarmerie, and the internal security forces that perform police functions. Outwardly, this is such a logical and simple scheme that it resembles the structure of the law enforcement agencies of some European country.
Even the scandals in which the Lebanese security services are involved are very similar to those in Europe. For example, in 1999, the country's Minister of Posts and Communications, Issam Nuaman, admitted that the special services had tapped the phones of high-ranking government and political figures. An investigation by the Interior Ministry and the relevant parliamentary committee revealed that the practice of wiretapping began as early as 1948. As soon as this was revealed, the country's parliamentary commission immediately sent a draft law on the legalization of wiretapping to the government for approval.
However, this is only an appearance. Even the principle of appointment to the post of director of intelligence has nothing to do with the way it is done in Europe. For example, Lebanon is a multi-religious state, where Christians (both Catholics and Orthodox) and Muslims (Shiites, Sunnis and Druze) live. As a result, the country has the principle of confessional representation in government structures. The President is a Christian, the Prime Minister is a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament is a Shiite. The same principle of distribution of positions applies to the special services.
However, in addition to religion, there is also the party principle of the distribution of portfolios. The Amal Party, in the recent past the same militant terrorist organization as Hezbollah, has now settled down, integrated into the state system of power and dissolved its own special services. In return, Amal was able to appoint its own people to the leadership of the state special services.
However, this is not all. Lebanon has been the site of the Arab war with Israel for too long to completely rid itself of the protectorate of its stronger neighbors. While Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanon in 2000, Syria, whose military contingent has been in the country since April 1976, did so only recently.
Southern Lebanon exists under the rule of the Shiite radical group Hezbollah, which in turn has its own intelligence, counterintelligence and security service. They are supervised by the famous "terrorist No. 2" Imad Mughniyeh, nicknamed "Hyena".
He began his career in the Joint Security Directorate of the Palestinian Fatah under the leadership of one of Yasser Arafat's closest associates, Salah Khalaf, and in the mid-80s moved to the operational department of Hezbollah. His duties included conducting intelligence, sabotage and terrorist operations outside Lebanon with the help of Iranian intelligence. It was he who oversaw the hostage-taking of two employees of the Soviet embassy, Oleg Spirin and Arkady Katkov, an employee of the trade mission, Valery Myrikov, and the embassy doctor, Nikolai Svirsky, in 1985.
Relations between State intelligence agencies and Hezbollah colleagues are not an internal matter in Lebanon. As a result of the trilateral agreements between Lebanon, Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has been given free rein in Southern Lebanon, as the group bears the brunt of the war with Israel. As a result, every conflict that may arise between the country's authorities and Hezbollah will have an international rather than an internal character.
Do not forget that in the territory of Southern Lebanon there is still a contingent of the IRGC-the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. Therefore, at the moment, Hezbollah is inviolable.
On February 14, former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was assassinated in Lebanon. The country's opposition is inclined to blame the Lebanese and Syrian special services for this tragedy. Shortly after the assassination, all the leaders of the Lebanese security services were removed from their posts. The head of military intelligence, Raymond Azar, left the country with his wife and children and settled in Paris.
JORDAN
In Jordan, "civilian" intelligence services dominate military intelligence. Although the army is the mainstay of the regime, it nevertheless poses a potential threat to the royal family. In many of the plots that took place in Jordan, the military has always been the main actors.
The Jordan General Intelligence Service (SORA) ("Mukhabarat al-Amma") was established in 1964 by a decision of the State Parliament. Its first leader was Mohammed Rasool al-Geylani. He came from a noble family and graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Damascus. According to the weekly Version, al-Geylani began his career in the military prosecutor's office, then served in the army intelligence service and in 1964 was appointed head of the Mukhabarat al-Amma . In this position, he showed particular zeal in the fight against Palestinian terrorist organizations, for which he was dismissed in 1968. In 1973-1974, he again headed the SOR.
The Mukhabarat al-Amma is the kingdom's most powerful intelligence agency and ensures the stability of the Hashemite regime. At the same time, the SOR performs the functions of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. It monitors the activities of foreign intelligence services, terrorist and opposition organizations, as well as other anti-state phenomena.
Usually, the head of the Mukhabarat al-Amma is appointed by a high-ranking army officer who reports to the Prime Minister and is a personal adviser to the King. The selection of new employees is based on their intellectual performance, background and loyalty to the regime.
In addition to the highly professional staff, SOR has a modern technical base. Thanks to this, over the years of its existence, the General Intelligence Service has established itself as a very effective special service. It controls almost all spheres of social and political life in the country.
The Mukhabarat al-Amma also has virtually unlimited powers. Within Jordan, the SOR has a large network of agents. In the past, the SOR has given priority to Palestinian organizations. In the last decade, Islamist groups have taken their place.
The headquarters is divided into several departments. The most important is the Department of Internal Security. It specializes in Islamist and Palestinian organizations, and controls all religious institutions, the opposition, the student movement, and refugee camps. Important elements of the SOR are the Intelligence Directorate for Arab Countries, the Research Directorate, the Propaganda Department, etc. The SOR also provides security for Jordanian embassies abroad and guards important government facilities inside the country.
The headquarters of the General Intelligence Service is located in Amman. Its regional offices also operate in the cities of Al-Zarqa, Irbid, Jarash, Es-Salt, Madaba, Al-Mafraq, Aqaba, Ma'an, Tafilah and Qarah.
Since the accession to the Jordanian throne of King Abdullah II, according to experts of the website " Agency. Ru", has lost the influence on Israeli-Palestinian relations that his late father had. Today, at the regional level, it is unquestionably inferior to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Its position in the West Bank and especially in East Jerusalem has also weakened significantly.
Under King Hussein, the Hashemite throne had considerable influence on religious life in the area and was even considered the guardian of Muslim shrines. Now almost no one remembers it. However, the main test of Abdallah has yet to be overcome. The most serious threat to his regime lies in Jordan itself. The recent terrorist attacks are evidence of this...
It is appropriate to recall that in Jordan, the organized opposition to the regime is represented by various Islamist groups, of which there are more than a dozen in the kingdom. Many of them are closely associated with their associates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This primarily concerns the branch of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun ("Association of Muslim Brothers"), Hamas and a number of groups" Al-Jihad al-Islami "("Islamic Jihad"). Their main backbone is made up of Palestinians.
At the same time, the majority of the Palestinian community in Jordan (more than 60% of the population) traditionally adheres to opposition sentiments. Almost all the terrorist attacks that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom since its formation have also been the work of Palestinians.
Thus, it is clear that the ruling elite from the very beginning perceived the "Al-Aqsa intifada" as a real threat to the stability of the regime. At the same time, King Abdullah had to constantly maneuver between "Arab unity", the sentiments of "his" Palestinians, on the one hand, and the objective geopolitical and economic interests of the monarchy, on the other.
No less paradoxical is the attitude of Amman towards the question of an independent Palestinian State. At all official conferences, forums, meetings, etc., the Jordanian representatives strongly supported its creation. However, in secret talks with the Americans and Israelis, they expressed fears that an "independent Palestine" would have a destabilizing effect on Jordan. Most of all, the ruling elite of the country is afraid of the transition of the Jordan Valley under the jurisdiction of "Palestine". In such a scenario, this area (until 1967, it was under the control of Amman) could turn into a springboard for the Jordanian opposition.
Before the start of the al-Aqsa intifada, the General Intelligence Service was led by Sami al-Batihi, who was quite successful in his duties. However, the new situation in the region required a new approach to the activities of the Jordanian intelligence. So King Abdullah decided to replace Batihi with the younger Saad Hir.
SAUDI ARABIA
For the past thirty years, the security services of this Arab state have been involved in the most important world events for various reasons. They were given a major role in the organization of the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan in the 80s, in the 90s they were very close to the Taliban movement, at the end of the last century, the Saudi General Intelligence Service (SOR) was increasingly mentioned as a central player in the organization of the export of Arab mercenaries, including to Chechnya.
The General Intelligence Service of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (SOR KSA) — in Arabic, "Istikhbarat al-Amma".
With its control of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and nearly a quarter of the world's oil reserves, Riyadh is aggressively claiming leadership in the Muslim world. The implementation of its geopolitical ambitions is largely facilitated by the internal stability of the royal family regime. It relies on three main forces: members of the ruling clan, the Wahhabi clergy, and a powerful security system. The latter includes the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Intelligence and counterintelligence services, as well as the National Guard. They are joined by the Faisal bin Turki Special Forces Brigade No. 1, which occupies a privileged position in the armed forces.
SOR is one of the most secret intelligence services in the Islamic world. It was created in the second half of the 50s a little later than the rest of the security structures of the kingdom. CIA instructors played an important role in its formation and training.
At the initial stage, the main task of the SDF was to neutralize the subversive activities of the Arab States, especially Iraq and Egypt, aimed at overthrowing the monarchy and supporting the left-wing opposition. The primary focus was on Cairo — the main opponent of Riyadh in the intra-Arab arena.
Since the mid-60s, the SOR has been providing assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood, which represented the main opposition to President Nasser. In the future, cooperation with this organization and the more radical groups that broke away from it became a priority for Saudi intelligence. Turki al-Faisal, who headed it in 1976, significantly improved the mechanism of interaction with the Islamist movement. On his initiative and with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, the service became the main means of covert Saudi influence at the international level. By the way, the sharp rise in prices on the world oil market that appeared in the early 70s created extremely favorable conditions for this, since a significant part of the income received was allocated to the needs of exploration. It also financed dozens of Islamist organizations of a religious-educational and military-political nature in the countries of Asia and Africa. Their secret ties with the Global leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, and through it their dependence on the SOR, allowed Riyadh to effectively influence the situation in these regions.
In the mid-70s, the intelligence service of Saudi Arabia significantly strengthens cooperation with the special services of the United States and France. Together with them, the SOR develops a global doctrine to neutralize the Soviet presence in Muslim countries. To this end, in 1976, the so-called Safari Club was formed, which included the intelligence services of Riyadh, Tehran, Cairo and Rabat. The activities of this alliance are funded by Saudi Arabia. In many regions of Asia and Africa, it aims to create or support Islamic organizations that represent an alternative to pro-Soviet liberation movements or regimes associated with the USSR. So, together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia supports the Islamic opposition of South Yemen, and together with Morocco-the Angolan group UNITA.
As a counterweight to the Soviet influence on a number of PLO factions, the leadership of Syria, Libya and Algeria, with the help of other members of the Safari Club, begins to provide assistance to their internal opponents, the Islamists. In 1978, after the revolution in Afghanistan, Turki al-Faisal establishes a similar cooperation with the chief of the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI), Geylani Khan. It was aimed at supporting not only the Islamic opposition in Afghanistan, but also Islamist groups in India, a strategic ally of the USSR in South Asia.
At the turn of the 70s — 80s, the SOR changes its tactics. It is not without the participation of Turki al-Faisal's adviser on Muslim issues in the USSR, the ethnic Uzbek Khoja Jamshid, that Saudi intelligence moves to operations directly against the Soviet Union. The first step in this direction was the creation in 1978 of the International Organization for Free Press and Information, headquartered in Cairo.
A few years later, with the participation of the" Safari Club "(which by that time had left the Iranian intelligence service), the organization" Maktab al-Khidmat " was created, responsible for mobilizing volunteers for the war in Afghanistan. Its main patrons are the Turks al-Faisal and William Casey, who headed the CIA in January 1981. They were also the authors of the global sabotage against Moscow, based on the manipulation of prices on the world oil market, so it was planned to undermine the Soviet economy.
To destabilize the internal political situation in the USSR, the SOR and the CIA are developing a plan to support the Islamic underground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For its implementation, a variety of structures are involved, from the "harmless" Summer Linguistic Institute to the "Hezb-i Islami" Hekmatyar. By the way, at that time the SOR had its agents even in the Soviet capital. They were Arab students who studied at universities in Moscow and belonged to the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the first half of the 90s, the SOR, along with the ISI, was one of the founders of the Taliban movement and until the beginning of 2002 maintained fairly close contacts with it (including through the Saudi Ambassador in Islamabad). The SOR has been equally active through various structures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and with the support of the ISI in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Muslim regions of Russia. According to some sources, Saudi diplomats were also used in this case, in particular, the head of the Islamic department of the embassy in Moscow, Suleiman al-Moghoshi, and Consul Abdullah al-Hamidi.
In 2001, the SOR significantly reduced the scope of its activities in Russia. In August of the same year, exactly 11 days before the terrorist attacks in the United States, Turki al-Faisal left his post, and in July 2002, his new position was announced — the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in London. Instead, the SOR was headed by Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz, who appointed Lieutenant-General Mahmud bin-Muhammad Bakhsh as his deputy for the operational part.
Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz is the twentieth son of the founder of the modern Saudi Kingdom, Abd al-Aziz, and the brother of Crown Prince Abdullah. Born in 1934. He began his career as the governor of Riyadh. Then he headed the Ministry of Finance, and in 1970-the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the same year, he became a member of the so-called Sudairi Seven, which determines the internal and foreign policy of the kingdom.
Since the beginning of the 90s, he has been paying great attention to the development of relations with Muslim countries, in particular with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Iran and Palestine. He heads the "Al-Aqsa Intifada Humanitarian Aid Commission", which supports the Palestinian Islamist movement. In March 2002, on the eve of the 14th Arab League summit, he suffered a stroke. He was admitted to the American University Hospital in Beirut. Now Naif ibn Abd al-Aziz has fully returned to active work.
This year, Saudi Arabia established a financial intelligence service to combat the financing of terrorism. According to experts, the creation of such intelligence (it will collect, analyze financial information and share it with foreign colleagues to track and combat money laundering and terrorist sponsorship) is a crucial step that demonstrates the kingdom's commitment to combating money laundering and terrorism. So far, such units are only available in four Arab States: Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
ALGERIA
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, who was elected in 1999, reshuffled the army's top command in February 2000, replacing the commanders of four of the six military districts and changing the command of the National Gendarmerie, the Navy, the Republican Guard and the General Staff of the Army. He promoted graduates of Soviet and French military universities to key positions. The same line was drawn in the special services.
Today, the Algerian intelligence community includes the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, the Directorate of Internal Security, the Directorate of Documentation and Security, the Special Security Service, the Counterinsurgency Coordination Command, and the Special Forces.
In June 2002, a new Cabinet of Ministers of Algeria was formed, in which the post of Minister of the Interior was taken by the patriarch of the Algerian special services, 64-year-old Nuriddin Yazid Zerhouni. He began his career in 1956 in the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and took an active part in the resistance to the French colonial authorities. In the 60s and 70s, he was one of the key figures in the country's intelligence community. Its activity spread both to the nearby countries of the Maghreb and the Arab East, and to remote areas of the African continent. At the same time, Zerhouni established close ties with representatives of the special services of Egypt, Cuba and Germany.
Shadli Benjedid, who came to power in 1979, regarded Zerhuni as a dangerous rival, and therefore in 1982 sent him as an ambassador to distant Mexico. From 1987 to 1992, he headed the Algerian Embassy in the United States. After returning to his homeland, Zerhuni retired. However, seven years later, the new President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, called him back into service. Zerhuni became one of three ministers who moved from the old government cabinet to the new one. His main task as chief of the Interior Ministry is to fight against radical Islamic groups and develop ties with the special services of the Maghreb, the Middle East and Europe.
Over the past twenty years, the Algerian security services have been subjected to repeated and often completely meaningless reforms. They were constantly merged, renamed, and re-divided. Of course, this process was also influenced by the large-scale and generally rather unsuccessful fight against Islamic extremists. In 1993, it led Algeria to a civil war, numerous terrorist attacks, and the murder of foreign tourists and diplomats.
TUNISIA
Tunisia gained independence in 1956. In March of the same year, elections to the National Assembly were held. Habib Bourguiba formed his first government.
On July 25, 1957, the republic was proclaimed. Bourguiba was elected President. On November 7, 1987, he was deposed. On this day, at 7.30 am, the voice of Tunisian Prime Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben-Ali was heard from the loudspeakers, announcing the overthrow of Bugriba and the appointment of himself as President of Tunisia. According to the official version, by this act, Ben-Ali thwarted the threat of a putsch prepared by the fundamentalists and scheduled for the morning of November 8. Ben-Ali remains the country's president today.
In 2002, the Tunisian security services intensified their activities in international and regional organizations in the context of the fight against international terrorism. President Ben-Ali has put at the forefront the task of eliminating conditions for the resuscitation of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, which can destabilize the internal political situation in the country. According to the Tunisian leadership, religious fanaticism is the main potential threat to the stability and security of the country. Tunisia has acceded to 11 of the 12 universal conventions on cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
On 23 July 2003, the Minister of the Interior and Local Development, Hedy Mhenni, told Parliament that in six months of 2003, the Tunisian security services had managed to prevent 66 attempts of illegal emigration from Tunisia to European countries by sea. At the same time, the minister said, of the 1,329 detainees, 70% were citizens from neighboring African states and Asian countries.
The Tunisian special services also solve internal problems. They are aimed at exercising tight control over the Islamist opposition inside and outside the country, suppressing any manifestations of the emergence of any political organizations on a religious basis, preventing the penetration of extremist groups, weapons, explosives, counterfeit banknotes and drugs into the country, detaining and extraditing criminals and suspects of committing dangerous crimes.
Thanks to cooperation with the special services of European (Belgium, Italy) and Arab (Algeria) countries, the Tunisian law enforcement agencies managed to uncover the affiliation of 34 Tunisians to the Islamist terrorist group "Ahl al-Jamaa wa-s-Sunna", which operated in Italy as a structural link in the network of providing and recruiting mercenaries for Al-Qaeda.
Contacts between the special services of Tunisia and Belgium are continuing to search for individuals who were part of the so-called "Tunisian Islamic Militant Group" linked to Al-Qaeda. According to intelligence officials, two members of this group, posing as journalists, in September 2001, committed the murder of the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud.
Today, the Tunisian intelligence community includes the Ministry of the Interior and Local Development; the Directorate of State Security; the Gendarmerie; and special bodies under the Ministry of Defense.
MOROCCO
In 1999, King Hassan II died suddenly. The vacant throne was taken by his 35-year-old son, Sidi Mohamed (Mohammed VI, or, as the Moroccans call him, "M6").
First of all, the new king replaced the chief of the Counterintelligence Service, appointing Colonel Hamida Laanigri to this post. He also dismissed the former king's all-powerful Interior Minister Driss Basri, replacing him with Ahmed Midawi. The monarch also created a new post of Secretary of State for the Interior, appointing a personal friend of the new Interior Minister, Fouad Ali el-Himma.
According to Andrei Soldatov, an expert on the special services, two secret meetings of representatives of the special services and the Foreign Ministry of Morocco with their Israeli counterparts took place several years ago at the King's initiative. During the talks, the sides discussed the resumption of bilateral cooperation in the field of security, in particular in the fight against Islamist organizations, as well as the prospect of intensifying Rabat's mediation efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The initiative to resume dialogue with Israel, which was interrupted as a result of the Al-Aqsa intifada, also belonged to Mohammed VI. At the same time, the cooperation of the Moroccan special services with the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence Service of Saudi Arabia has significantly intensified.
LIBYA
Today, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has two special services at his disposal. These are the military intelligence Service (Istikhbarat al-Askariya) and the Secret Organization of the Jamahiriya (Hayat Amn al-Jamahiriya) — the Libyan equivalent of the KGB.
Since December 2002, the military intelligence service has been headed by Abdullah Sanoussi. The secret organization of the Jamahiriya is headed by Musa Kusa, who is in the rank of Deputy Foreign Minister, who distinguished himself in the Lockerbie case. In addition, Musa Kusa heads the so-called Anti-Imperialist Center, which is used to support terrorists. The second person in the Secret Organization is Suleiman Ashiri.
Internal security is headed by the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Mohammed Ali al-Misrati.
The functions of maintaining order are carried out by the security battalions ("Kataib al-Amn») They are located in all major Libyan cities.
Gaddafi does not hesitate to place people who are accused of terrorism in European countries in key positions in the special services. For example, in 1999, Abdallah Sanoussi was sentenced in absentia to life in hard labor in France for organizing an explosion on board a civilian airliner DS-10. But this did not prevent the Libyan leader from appointing him chief of military intelligence, especially since he had previously led the Secret Organization of the Jamahiriya.
QATAR
Three structures are responsible for ensuring State security in Qatar: the Investigation Police ("Mukhabarat"), the State Security Investigation Department ("Mabahis") and the Military Intelligence Service ("Mukhabarat al-Askariya").
The Investigation Police is part of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of the State Security Investigation Department is to combat espionage. The main task of military intelligence is to ensure the security of the armed forces of Qatar. It is also responsible for combating terrorism and political dissidents.
Qatari law provides only two scenarios for those accused of espionage: the death penalty or a full acquittal.
Qatar's special services maintain fairly close contacts with the Israeli intelligence community.
For almost 60 years, Israel has remained the main target of the interests of the Arab secret services. They are interested in the structures of various parties, the alignment of political forces in the country, government plans, the armed forces, military doctrine, the economy, cooperation with foreign states, relations with the Jewish diaspora, Zionist organizations, etc.
No less interesting than the "Zionist enemy" for the Arab intelligence services are... the Arab states. This is part of what is called the "Arab Cold war," which has often turned into a "hot war" — in Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria. The efforts made by some Arab secret services to overthrow the regime in the "brotherly" country have never weakened and even surpassed the activity directed against Israel.
One of the main sources of information for the Arab intelligence services is the flow of messages published by foreign media. But this information is clearly not enough. Therefore, the Mukhabarat, in an effort to raise intelligence gathering to a higher level, create "bases" abroad, sometimes far from the Middle East. These "bases" not only allow you to identify agents working for Israel, but also provide an opportunity to obtain information about both the Jewish state and the Arab countries.
Original message
Одной из отличительных черт восточного государства является наличие мощного и всеохватывающего полицейского аппарата. Уже многие десятилетия правящие арабские режимы держатся на армиях и спецслужбах. В арабских странах существует два вида секретных служб («мухабарат») — «гражданские» и «военные». Каждая выполняет свои задачи. Единственное, что их «роднит», — плотная завеса тайны.
Службы военной разведки осуществляют сбор информации военного характера за границей. Службы безопасности («гражданские») занимаются преимущественно защитой существующего в стране режима. Впрочем, в последние годы они заметно расширили сферу своей деятельности и занимаются не только внутренними проблемами. В случае необходимости они проводят операции за пределами страны с целью «нейтрализации» противников режима. Главная задача «гражданских» спецслужб — добиться полного доверия политического руководства, что позволило бы взять под свой контроль военную разведку и главенствовать в разведывательном сообществе страны.
С момента создания арабских секретных служб они предназначались в первую очередь для борьбы с оппозицией, действовавшей как внутри страны, так и за ее пределами. Но со временем они превратились в настоящие органы национальной безопасности. Этот феномен — результат постоянных усилий, направленных на сохранение равновесия (или нейтрализацию) различных центров власти, на которых держится режим. Уместно подчеркнуть, что «гражданские» секретные службы в арабских странах были традиционно сосредоточены на внутренних проблемах. Более того, до провозглашения 15 мая 1948 года Государства Израиль арабские страны не имели своей внешней разведки.
Данная традиция объясняется отчасти характером арабских спецслужб, которые являются не только инструментом поддержки режимов и обеспечения национальной безопасности, но и орудием влияния на политическую жизнь этих государств. Не удивительно, что, когда бывший руководитель секретной службы начинает заниматься политической деятельностью, ему зачастую трудно четко определить разделительную линию между старой и новой функциями и избежать влияния одной на другую. Кстати сказать, офицеры арабских спецслужб довольно часто восходят на политический Олимп. Например, в Египте после революции 1952 года около 20 из них стали министрами, а некоторые, как Мамдух Салем, — премьер-министрами.
Опасность, исходящая от внутренней оппозиции и внешних врагов, вынуждает арабские секретные службы тратить значительную часть времени и усилий на контрразведывательную деятельность. Государственные перевороты и революции, которые сотрясали страны Ближнего Востока, заставляют руководителей контрразведки постоянно выявлять элементы, угрожающие режимам.
«Мухабарат» арабских стран противостоит подпольной деятельности внутренней оппозиции и иностранных спецслужб. С этой целью контрразведка выполняет защитные и наступательные функции. Первый аспект — это обеспечение безопасности. Второй — контрразведка.
Главная задача контрразведки — помешать противнику (как внутри страны, так и за ее пределами) нанести ущерб национальным интересам, проникнуть в государственные структуры и получить доступ к секретным документам. Для этого используются самые различные средства: проверка кандидатов на государственные посты, официальная или тайная цензура, надзор за различными кругами и группами, в которых может вестись какая-либо подпольная антиправительственная деятельность. Сотрудники спецслужб или агенты внедряются в эти структуры с целью сбора информации, выявления лиц, представляющих опасность режиму.
ЕГИПЕТ
В Египте ведущую роль играют «гражданские» спецслужбы. Не удивительно, что в 1967 и 1970 годах руководители именно этих спецслужб участвовали в заговорах против режима. Их же коллеги из военной разведки не только сохранили лояльность правительству, но и продемонстрировали свою поддержку властям.
Египетские спецслужбы включают: «Мухабарат аль-Амма» (Служба общей разведки), «Мухабарат аль-Харбия» (Военная разведка), «Мухабарат ад-Дауля» (Главное управление расследований госбезопасности), «Джигаз Амн ад-Дауля» (Служба госбезопасности).
Службой общей разведки (СОР) на протяжении многих лет руководит Омар Сулейман аль-Рифаи. Он родился в 1938 году. Имеет юридическое образование. Возглавляет СОР с 1991 года. До 2000 года оглашение любой информации о нем было запрещено государственной цензурой Египта. Является одной из наиболее влиятельных фигур в окружении президента Хосни Мубарака. Отвечает за внешнюю разведку и контрразведку, а также контролирует обеспечение безопасности президента и первых лиц государства. Израильские и американские эксперты приписывают ему главную заслугу в нейтрализации вооруженной исламской оппозиции. Курирует важнейшие политические и экономические вопросы, в том числе и в отношениях с другими странами, а также все связи с Ливией и Ираном. Часто выступает в качестве личного представителя президента Мубарака на переговорах с Израилем, США и арабскими странами. Уделяет большое внимание деятельности Службы общей разведки Саудовской Аравии на территории Египта и за его пределами. Считает Эр-Рияд одним из главных геополитических и региональных соперников Каира.
С середины 90-х курирует израильско-палестинское направление египетской внешней политики. В январе 1997 года был одним из инициаторов создания полугосударственной общественной ассоциации «Каир — за мир», до осени 2000 года выступавшей за развитие связей с Израилем в экономической и научной областях. В 2000-2001 годах неоднократно исполнял роль посредника между Израилем и Палестинской национальной администрацией с целью положить конец вооруженным столкновениям на палестинских территориях. С декабря 2000 года служит основным каналом связи между Египтом и Израилем. С мая 2002 года занимается реформированием силовых структур ПНА. Поддерживает отношения с руководителями большинства спецслужб Ближнего Востока, а также тесные связи с главой ЦРУ.
По информации израильской военной разведки (АМАН), обладает прагматичным мышлением. Инициативен, но при этом показал себя как превосходный исполнитель. Немногословен, отличается эмоциональной устойчивостью, хладнокровием и сдержанностью. Одна из главных его черт — полная преданность президенту. Эксперты АМАНа, специализирующиеся на Египте, характеризуют этого человека как аса шпионажа высшего класса.
Практически то же самое можно услышать и от тех немногих израильских политических деятелей из окружения премьер-министра Ариэля Шарона, которые лично знакомы с главой египетской СОР и дали согласие хоть что-то рассказать об этом человеке. Отметим, что после одной из встреч с Омаром Сулейманом бывший министр обороны Израиля Биньямин (Фуад) Бен-Элиэзер сказал: «Это один из наиболее серьезных людей, с которыми я когда-либо был знаком».
В последние годы Омар Сулейман сконцентрировал в своих руках гораздо больше полномочий и власти, нежели другие египетские госчиновники, а также его коллеги в соседних арабских странах. Возглавляемая им структура имеет самые широкие полномочия, далеко выходящие за рамки непосредственно разведывательной деятельности.
Сегодня эта спецслужба не только отвечает не только за внешнюю разведку и контрразведку, но и обеспечивает личную безопасность президента и первых лиц государства и вместе с тем курирует важные политические и экономические вопросы как в самой стране, так и за ее пределами. Поэтому не удивительно, что человек, стоящий во главе столь мощной организации, является одной из фигур, наиболее приближенных к президенту Мубараку.
Кстати, дом, в котором проживает глава СОР со своей многочисленной семьей, расположенный в престижном районе египетской столицы Гелиополис, находится практически в двух шагах от апартаментов самого президента. По уровню доверия, которое питает к Омару Сулейману египетский лидер, сравниться с шефом СОР могут еще лишь три человека: министр пропаганды Сафуат аш-Шариф, политический советник президента Осама эль-Баз и директор президентской канцелярии Захария Азми.
Лучший период отношений между спецслужбами Египта и СССР приходится на конец 60-х — начало 70-х годов. После смерти Гамаля Абдель Насера президентом Египта стал Анвар Садат, который стремился постепенно изменить политическую ориентацию с просоветской на проамериканскую.
В сентябре 1994 года Президент РФ подписал распоряжение № 492 «О заключении Соглашения между Федеральной службой контрразведки Российской Федерации и Службой общей разведки Арабской Республики Египет о сотрудничестве».
В последнее время в египетских СМИ все чаще стали появляться сообщения, содержащие информацию о работе СОР и ее руководителя. По мнению экспертов, идет целенаправленная PR-кампания, цель которой — «раскрутить» наиболее вероятного преемника нынешнего президента Египта. А представители западных и израильских спецслужб уже не раз заявляли, что в настоящее время больше всего шансов занять президентское кресло имеет могущественный руководитель СОР Омар Сулейман аль-Рифаи.
Что касается Израиля, то в своем отношении к еврейскому государству, как подчеркивает израильский эксперт по спецслужбам Михаил Фальков, Сулейман Рифаи, как и в других вопросах внешней политики, руководствуется исключительно соображениями практической целесообразности и не разделяет истерично-патриотических взглядов многих египетских политиков, занимающих крайне антиизраильскую позицию. Уже после начала «интифады Аль-Акса» он приложил максимум усилий для достижения перемирия между конфликтующими сторонами.
С приходом к власти Ариэля Шарона Сулейман Рифаи несколько раз с тайными визитами посетил Израиль, где встречался с премьером, главой МИДа, министром обороны, а также с руководством израильских спецслужб. По мнению одного высокопоставленного представителя израильского руководства, «связи с этим человеком имеют первостепенное стратегическое значение для еврейского государства и ситуации во всем ближневосточном регионе».
Сегодня Сулейман Рифаи существенно укрепил контакты с ЦРУ и Службой общей разведки Иордании.
В силу всего вышесказанного ясно, что прогнозы израильских и западных спецслужб, согласно которым Сулейман Рифаи вполне может стать следующим президентом Египта, имеют под собой особо веские основания, хотя в самом египетском истеблишменте есть немало весьма влиятельных фигур, не приемлющих подобного сценария развития событий. Так, противники шефа СОР есть как среди ветеранов египетского МИДа, так и в армейском командовании.
Со времен Насера и вплоть до нынешнего лидера Египта во главе этой региональной державы стояли армейские офицеры. Не исключено, что вскоре эта традиция будет нарушена и на смену военной касте придут профессионалы из спецслужб.
СИРИЯ
В столь тонком деле, как спецслужбы, Сирия всегда опиралась на помощь более старших коллег. Возглавивший в 2000 году страну после смерти отца Башар Асад традиции не изменил.
Этой традиции поиска «учителя» уже более полувека. Причем первыми в этой роли побывали специалисты из СС. Считается, что «отцом» спецслужб Сирии был Алоиз Брюннер, три раза приговоренный к смерти французским судом. По некоторым данным, вплоть до октября 1991 года он жил в сирийской столице и лишь позже его перевезли в портовый город Латакию. По слухам, там он и умер в 1996 году.
Вторым «учителем» для спецслужб Сирии стал Египет. В феврале 1958 года две страны объединились под названием Объединенной Арабской Республики (ОАР). В таком качестве Сирия существовала до 1961 года.
До создания ОАР спецслужбы Сирии включали Второе бюро (в составе армии), Управление общей безопасности (в МВД) и Управление общей разведки.
В результате объединения с Египтом Второе бюро перешло под контроль египетской военной разведки, Управление общей безопасности превратилось в подразделение Директората секретных служб Египта, а Управление общей разведки было переименовано в Специальное бюро, которое должно было осуществлять наиболее деликатные операции. Например, эта структура унаследовала от Второго бюро палестинских «федаинов» (в переводе с арабского — «жертвующие собой»), которые занимались как сбором информации, так и проведением акций саботажа или терактов на территории Израиля.
Естественно, что практически одновременно с египтянами в Сирии появились советские военные советники. Однако вряд ли российская поддержка сегодня очень интересует Сирию. Молодой президент ищет помощи у двух супердержав — США и Китая. И в этом Сирии не мешает даже шлейф спонсора террористов.
Правивший Сирией с 1971 по 2000 годы Хафез Асад сильно укрепил полицию и службу безопасности страны. В настоящее время политической полицией государства является служба внутренней безопасности. Однако контрразведкой занимается не только эта структура.
Есть сведения, что уже к 1987 году аппарат внутренней безопасности состоял из огромного числа организаций с перекрывающими друг друга функциями, поскольку в других спецслужбах также были свои отделы внутренней безопасности. При этом каждая организация напрямую подчинялась президенту и его ближайшим советникам. Эти организации действовали совершенно независимо друг от друга и имели не совсем четко очерченные границы своих полномочий.
В начале 2000 года во главе службы внутренней безопасности встал генерал Асеф Шаукат — муж старшей сестры президента Башара Асада. Сегодня его считают едва ли не самым влиятельным сирийским силовиком. Шаукат родился в 1950 году в городе Тартусе. Происходит из простой семьи алавитов. В 1968 году поступил на юридический факультет госуниверситета, а также стал членом правящей партии Баас. С 1972 по 1976 годы продолжал учебу в том же университете на историческом факультете. Тема докторской диссертации — великое сирийское восстание 1925 года.
В 1978 году поступил в высшую военную академию. В 1983-м получил звание офицера. В середине 80-х Шаукат был простым офицером сухопутных войск сирийской армии. В конце 80-х он познакомился с единственной дочерью президента Хафеза Асада Бушрой, которая была на десять лет моложе его и в то время заканчивала учебу на факультете фармакологии Дамасского университета.
Семье не понравился выбор дочери. На сторону Шауката встал только Башар, нынешний президент. При его поддержке в 1995 году Шаукат, разведясь со своей первой женой, официально женился на Бушре.
Единственному зятю было присвоено звание генерал-майора. После этого Башар очень сблизился с Асефом, и тогдашний президент Хафез Асад даже назначил его советником сына по вопросам безопасности. Именно Шаукат был инициатором серии чисток в правительственном, армейском и партийном аппаратах.
Этим возвышением в президентской семье были довольны не все. В 1999 году третий сын президента Асада Махер даже стрелял в Шауката прямо во дворце. Но карьере зятя это не помешало. Сначала он был назначен на пост заместителя директора Службы военной разведки, а в начале 2000 года возглавил Службу внутренней безопасности.
В Сирии четыре спецслужбы. Все они находятся непосредственно под контролем президента и обладают перекрывающими друг друга функциями. Так что режим не зависит ни от одной из них. При этом внутри каждой службы начальники различных отделов часто напрямую подчинены президенту, а не своему номинальному директору.
Управление политической безопасности (УПБ) занимается выявлением признаков и следов организованной политической деятельности, направленной против интересов существующего режима. В его функции входят наблюдение и надзор за диссидентами, а также за деятельностью иностранцев, находящихся в стране, и их контактами с местными жителями. УПБ также осуществляет контроль за печатными изданиями и аудио- и видеопродукцией.
Главное управление безопасности (ГУБ) — основная гражданская разведывательная служба Сирии. Она делится на три отдела. Отдел внутренней безопасности занимается надзором за населением страны (обязанность, которая пересекается с УПБ). Глава внутренней безопасности ГУБ является политическим советником Башара Асада. Другие два отдела ГУБ занимаются осуществлением внешней безопасности (подобно ЦРУ). Это отдел по делам Палестины, который контролирует деятельность групп палестинцев в Сирии и Ливане, и отдел внешней безопасности.
Военная разведка. Формально она отвечает за обычный круг военных операций. Однако эта служба также занимается предоставлением военной и материально-технической помощи палестинцам, ливанцам и турецким экстремистским группам. По данным западных СМИ, она осуществляет контроль, а часто и организует теракты в отношении диссидентов за границей.
Воздушные разведывательные силы (ВРС). Несмотря на название, эта служба занимается не только своими прямыми обязанностями. Одним из командующих сирийскими воздушными силами был в свое время Хафез Асад. Придя к власти, он сосредоточил внимание на этой спецслужбе. В результате около 30 лет этой службой командовал доверенный советник президента генерал-майор Мухаммед аль-Хаули.
Внутри страны ВРС часто курировали спецоперации против исламских оппозиционных элементов. Например, они сыграли главную роль в подавлении «Братьев-мусульман» — секты фундаменталистов, восставших в 1970-х — начале 1980-х годов. В декабре 1999 года ВРС провела общенациональную охоту на членов исламской либеральной партии «Хизб ат-Тахрир».
Считается, что именно ВРС курирует поддержку Сирией международного терроризма. По данным западных СМИ, агенты этой спецслужбы за границей в сирийских посольствах и филиалах компании Сирийских национальных авиалиний координировали десятки терактов. Самый известный — попытка взорвать израильский лайнер в лондонском аэропорту Хитроу в апреле 1986 года.
ЛИВАН
Официальных, государственных спецслужб у Ливана три — «Амн аль-Амн» (Главное управление общей безопасности), «Амн ад-Дауля» (Управление государственной безопасности) и «Мухабарат арми» (Военная разведка). Плюс министерство внутренних дел, жандармерия и силы внутренней безопасности, выполняющие полицейские функции. Внешне это настолько логичная и простая схема, что напоминает структуру силовых ведомств какой-нибудь европейской страны.
Даже скандалы, в которые оказываются втянутыми спецслужбы Ливана, очень похожи на европейские. Например, в 1999 году министр почт и коммуникаций страны Исам Нуаман признал факт прослушивания спецслужбами телефонов высокопоставленных государственных и политических деятелей. Расследование, проведенное МВД и соответствующим парламентским комитетом, показало, что практика прослушивания телефонных переговоров началась еще в 1948 году. Как только это вскрылось, парламентская комиссия страны тут же направила в правительство для согласования проект закона о легализации прослушивания телефонных разговоров.
Однако это лишь видимость. Даже принцип назначения на пост директора разведки не имеет ничего общего с тем, как это делают в Европе. К примеру, Ливан — многоконфессиональное государство, где живут христиане (причем как католики, так и православные) и мусульмане (шииты, сунниты и друзы). В результате в стране существует принцип конфессионального представительства во властных структурах. Президент является христианином, премьер-министр — суннитом, а спикер парламента — шиитом. Тот же принцип раздачи должностей распространяется и на спецслужбы.
Однако, кроме вероисповедания, есть еще партийный принцип распределения портфелей. Партия «Амаль», в недалеком прошлом такая же боевая террористическая организация, как и «Хизбаллах», ныне остепенилась, встроилась в государственную систему власти и распустила собственные спецслужбы. Взамен «Амаль» получила возможность назначать своих людей в руководство государственных спецслужб.
Впрочем, и это еще не все. Ливан слишком долго был полигоном войны арабских стран с Израилем, чтобы полностью избавиться от протектората более сильных соседей. Если Израиль вывел свои войска в 2000 году с территории Ливана, Сирия, военный контингент которой находился в стране с апреля 1976 года, сделала это совсем недавно.
Южный Ливан существует под властью шиитской радикальной группировки «Хизбалла», которая в свою очередь имеет собственную разведку, контрразведку и службу безопасности. Курирует их знаменитый «террорист № 2» Имад Мугние по кличке «Гиена».
Он начал свою карьеру в Объединенном управлении безопасности палестинского ФАТХа под руководством одного из ближайших соратников Ясира Арафата — Салаха Халафа, а в середине 80-х перешел в оперативный отдел «Хизбалла». В его обязанности входило проведение разведывательных, диверсионных и террористических операций за пределами Ливана с помощью иранской разведки. Именно он курировал в 1985 году захват в заложники двух сотрудников советского посольства Олега Спирина и Аркадия Каткова, сотрудника торгпредства Валерия Мырикова, а также врача посольства Николая Свирского.
Отношения между государственными спецслужбами и коллегами из «Хизбалла» не являются внутренним делом Ливана. В результате трехсторонних договоренностей Ливана, Ирана и Сирии «Хизбалла» предоставлена свобода действий в Южном Ливане, так как эта группировка несет на себе основную тяжесть войны с Израилем. В результате каждый конфликт, который может возникнуть между властями страны и «Хизбалла», будет иметь не внутренний, а международный характер.
Не стоит забывать, что на территории Южного Ливана до сих пор находится контингент КСИР — Корпуса стражей исламской революции Ирана. Поэтому в настоящий момент «Хизбаллах» неприкосновенна.
14 февраля с.г. в Ливане был убит бывший премьер-министр Рафик аль-Харири. Оппозиция страны склонна обвинять в этой трагедии ливанские и сирийские спецслужбы. Вскоре после убийства все руководители ливанских спецслужб были сняты со своих постов. Глава военной разведки Раймон Азар вместе с женой и детьми покинул страну и обосновался в Париже.
ИОРДАНИЯ
В Иордании «гражданские» спецслужбы главенствуют над военной разведкой. Хотя армия и является опорой режима, она, тем не менее, представляет потенциальную угрозу королевской семье. Во многих заговорах, имевших место в Иордании, военные всегда были главными действующими лицами.
Служба общей разведки (СОР) Иордании («Мухабарат аль-Амма») была создана в 1964 году по решению государственного парламента. Ее первым руководителем был Мохаммед Расул аль-Гейлани. Он происходил из знатной семьи, окончил юридический факультет Дамасского университета. По данным еженедельника «Версия», аль-Гейлани начал свою карьеру в военной прокуратуре, затем служил в армейской разведке и в 1964 году был назначен начальником «Мухабарат аль-Амма». На этой должности он проявил особое рвение в борьбе с палестинскими террористическими организациями, за что и был в 1968 году отправлен в отставку. В 1973-1974 годах он снова возглавлял СОР.
«Мухабарат аль-Амма» является наиболее мощной спецслужбой королевства и обеспечивает стабильность хашимитского режима. Одновременно СОР исполняет функции внешней разведки и контрразведки. Она отслеживает деятельность иностранных спецслужб, террористических и оппозиционных организаций, а также другие явления антигосударственного характера.
Обычно на пост главы «Мухабарат аль-Амма» назначают высокопоставленного армейского офицера, который подчиняется премьер-министру и является личным советником короля. Отбор новых сотрудников проводится на основании их интеллектуальных показателей, происхождения и преданности режиму.
Помимо высокопрофессионального персонала, СОР обладает современной технической базой. Благодаря этому за годы своего существования Служба общей разведки зарекомендовала себя как весьма эффективная спецслужба. Она контролирует почти все сферы общественно-политической жизни в стране.
«Мухабарат аль-Амма» также обладает практически неограниченными полномочиями. В пределах Иордании СОР имеет многочисленную агентурную сеть. В прошлом СОР уделяла первостепенное внимание палестинским организациям. В последнее десятилетие их место заняли исламистские группировки.
Штаб-квартира делится на несколько управлений. Наиболее важным является Управление внутренней безопасности. Оно специализируется на исламистских и палестинских организациях, а также контролирует все религиозные учреждения, оппозицию, студенческое движение и лагеря беженцев. Важными звеньями СОР являются Управление разведки по арабским странам, исследовательское управление, отдел пропаганды и др. СОР также обеспечивает безопасность иорданских посольств за рубежом и охраняет важные государственные объекты внутри страны.
Штаб-квартира Службы общей разведки находится в Аммане. Ее региональные отделения также действуют в городах Эз-Зарка, Ирбид, Джараш, Эс-Салт, Мадаба, Эль-Мафрак, Акаба, Маан, Тафила и Карах.
С момента вступления на иорданский престол король Абдалла II, как отмечают эксперты сайта «Агентура. Ру», утратил то влияние на израильско-палестинские отношения, которое имел его покойный отец. Сегодня на региональном уровне он, бесспорно, уступает египетскому президенту Хосни Мубараку. Его позиции на Западном берегу Иордана и особенно в Восточном Иерусалиме также значительно ослабли.
При короле Хусейне хашимитский престол имел немалое влияние на религиозную жизнь в этом районе и даже считался хранителем мусульманских святынь. Теперь об этом почти никто не вспоминает. Однако главное испытание Абдалле еще предстоит преодолеть. Наиболее серьезная опасность его режиму кроется в самой Иордании. Недавние террористические акты — тому свидетельство...
Уместно напомнить, что в Иордании организованную оппозицию режиму представляют различные исламистские группировки, которых в королевстве больше десятка. Многие из них тесно связаны со своими единомышленниками на Западном берегу р. Иордан и в секторе Газы. Это в первую очередь касается отделения «Аль-Ихван аль-Муслимун» («Ассоциация мусульманских братьев»), «Хамаса» и ряда группировок «Аль-Джихад аль-Ислами» («Исламский джихад»). Основной их костяк составляют палестинцы.
Вместе с тем палестинская община в Иордании (более 60% населения) в большинстве своем традиционно придерживается оппозиционных настроений. Почти все теракты, прошедшие в Хашимитском королевстве с момента его образования, также были делом рук палестинцев.
Таким образом, видно, что правящая элита с самого начала воспринимала «интифаду Аль-Акса» как реальную угрозу стабильности режима. В то же время королю Абдалле приходилось постоянно лавировать между «арабским единством», настроениями «своих» палестинцев, с одной стороны, и объективными геополитическими и экономическими интересами монархии — с другой.
Не менее парадоксальным является и отношение Аммана к вопросу о независимом палестинском государстве. На всех официальных конференциях, форумах, встречах и т.п. иорданские представители решительно выступали за его создание. Однако на тайных переговорах с американцами и израильтянами они высказывали опасения, что «независимая Палестина» окажет дестабилизирующее влияние на Иорданию. Более всего правящую верхушку страны пугает переход Иорданской долины под юрисдикцию «Палестины». При подобном сценарии этот район (до 1967 года он находился под контролем Аммана) может превратиться в плацдарм для иорданской оппозиции.
До начала «интифады аль-Акса» Службой общей разведки руководил Самих аль-Батихи, который довольно успешно справлялся со своими обязанностями. Однако новая ситуация в регионе потребовала нового подхода к деятельности иорданской разведки. Поэтому король Абдалла решил заменить Батихи более молодым Саадом Хиром.
Сразу после вступления в должность состоялся визит нового шефа «Мухаббарат аль-Амма» в королевский дворец в Аммане. Там он на протяжении нескольких часов с глазу на глаз беседовал с иорданским монархом. Содержание этого разговора неизвестно. Однако имеется информация, что уже на следующий день в канцелярии Саада Хира был составлен весьма любопытный документ с грифом «совершенно секретно — для служебного пользования». Он предназначался для глав оперативных отделов Управления внутренней безопасности и Управления разведки по арабским странам в «Мухаббарат аль-Амма». В нем, в частности, обозначались новые приоритетные направления в работе данных управлений с корректировкой на изменившуюся ситуацию в регионе.
Взрывы, прогремевшие в Аммане 9 ноября с.г., являются не чем иным, как отголоском трагедии американских башен-близнецов. Как отмечают наблюдатели, хашимитское королевство вызывало ненависть экстремистов еще во времена короля Хусейна, отца нынешнего монарха. В 1970 году он выгнал из страны распоясавшихся палестинских боевиков, устроив бойню, которая вошла в историю как «Черный сентябрь», а в 1994 году король Хусейн подписал мирный договор с Израилем. И сегодня Иордания продолжает ту же политику. Король Абдалла — один из немногих, кто остался союзником США во время иракской кампании, предоставив американцам 15 аэродромов вместе с личным составом и техникой.
Американские спецслужбы сразу же усмотрели в терактах в гостиницах Аммана «следы» самого разыскиваемого в мире террориста, лидера иракского отделения «Аль-Каиды» Абу Мусаба аз-Заркауи.
После трагических событий в Аммане Абдалла переживает самый тяжелый период с того момента, как в 1999 году взошел на престол. Потребуется немало времени, чтобы затянулась рана, оставленная терактами, в которых погибли 57 человек.
САУДОВСКАЯ АРАВИЯ
Последние тридцать лет спецслужбы этого арабского государства по разным причинам оказывались участниками самых важных мировых событий. Им отводилась важнейшая роль в организации моджахедского движения в Афганистане в 80-х, в 90-х они очень близко контактировали с движением Талибан, в конце прошлого века Служба общей разведки Саудовской Аравии (СОР) все чаще упоминалась в качестве центрального игрока в организации экспорта арабских наемников, в том числе и в Чечню.
Служба общей разведки королевства Саудовской Аравии (СОР КСА) — по-арабски «Истихбарат аль-Амма».
Контролируя исламские святыни в Мекке, Медине и почти четверть мировых запасов нефти, Эр-Рияд настойчиво претендует на лидерство в мусульманском мире. Осуществлению его геополитических амбиций во многом способствует внутренняя стабильность режима королевской семьи. Она опирается на три основные силы: членов правящего клана, ваххабитское духовенство и мощную систему безопасности. Последняя включает МВД, службы общей разведки и контрразведки, а также Национальную гвардию. К ним примыкает бригада № 1 специального назначения имени Фейсала бин-Турки, занимающая привилегированное положение в составе вооруженных сил.
СОР представляет собой одну из самых засекреченных разведок исламского мира. Она была создана во второй половине 50-х чуть позже остальных структур безопасности королевства. Важную роль в ее формировании и подготовке кадров сыграли инструкторы ЦРУ.
На начальном этапе главная задача СОР заключалась в нейтрализации подрывной деятельности арабских государств, особенно Ирака и Египта, направленной на свержение монархии и поддержку левой оппозиции. Первостепенное внимание уделялось Каиру — главному противнику Эр-Рияда на внутриарабской арене.
С середины 60-х СОР приступает к оказанию помощи организации «Братья-мусульмане», представлявшей основную оппозицию президенту Насеру. В дальнейшем сотрудничество с этой организацией и отколовшимися от нее более радикальными группировками стало приоритетным направлением работы саудовской разведки. Возглавивший ее в 1976 году Турки аль-Фейсал значительно усовершенствовал механизм взаимодействия с исламистским движением. По его инициативе и с помощью «Братьев-мусульман» служба превратилась в главное средство тайного саудовского влияния на международном уровне. Кстати, проявившийся в начале 70-х резкий рост цен на мировом нефтяном рынке создал для этого чрезвычайно благоприятные условия, так как существенная часть полученных доходов отчислялась на нужды разведки. Она же финансировала десятки исламистских организаций религиозно-просветительского и военно-политического характера в странах Азии и Африки. Их тайные связи с Всемирным руководством организации «Братья-мусульмане», а через него и зависимость от СОР позволяли Эр-Рияду эффективно воздействовать на обстановку в указанных регионах.
В середине 70-х разведка Саудовской Аравии заметно укрепляет сотрудничество со спецслужбами США и Франции. Совместно с ними СОР разрабатывает глобальную доктрину нейтрализации советского присутствия в мусульманских странах. С этой целью в 1976 году формируется так называемый Сафари-клуб, в который вошли разведслужбы Эр-Рияда, Тегерана, Каира и Рабата. Деятельность этого альянса финансируется Саудовской Аравией. Во многих регионах Азии и Африки она направлена на создание или поддержку исламских организаций, представляющих альтернативу просоветским освободительным движениям или режимам, связанным с СССР. Так, совместно с Египтом Саудовская Аравия поддерживает исламскую оппозицию Южного Йемена, а вместе с Марокко — ангольскую группировку УНИТА.
В качестве противовеса советскому влиянию на ряд фракций ООП руководство Сирии, Ливии и Алжира СОР с помощью других членов «Сафари-клуба» начинает оказывать помощь их внутренним противникам — исламистам. В 1978 году после революции в Афганистане аналогичное сотрудничество Турки аль-Фейсал устанавливает с шефом пакистанской разведки (ИСИ) Гейлани Ханом. Оно было направлено на поддержку не только исламской оппозиции Афганистана, но и исламистских группировок Индии — стратегического союзника СССР в Южной Азии.
На рубеже 70 — 80-х годов СОР меняет свою тактику. Не без участия советника Турки аль-Фейсала по мусульманским вопросам в СССР этнического узбека Ходжи Джамшида саудовская разведка переходит к операциям непосредственно против Советского Союза. Первым шагом в этом направлении стало создание в 1978 году Международной организации свободной печати и информации со штаб-квартирой в Каире.
Несколько лет спустя при участии «Сафари-клуба» (который к тому времени покинула иранская разведка) создается организация «Мактаб аль-Хидмат», ответственная за мобилизацию добровольцев на войну в Афганистане. Главными ее покровителями выступают Турки аль-Фейсал и Уильям Кейси, в январе 1981-го возглавивший ЦРУ. Они же являлись авторами глобальной диверсии против Москвы, основанной на манипуляции ценами на мировом нефтяном рынке, — так планировалось подорвать советскую экономику.
Для дестабилизации внутриполитической обстановки в СССР СОР и ЦРУ разрабатывают план по поддержке исламского подполья Средней Азии и Кавказа. Для его реализации задействуются самые разные структуры от «безобидного» Летнего лингвистического института до «Хезб-и Ислами» Хекматияра. Кстати, в то время СОР имела своих агентов даже в советской столице. Ими являлись арабские студенты, обучавшиеся в вузах Москвы и относившиеся к местному отделению «Братьев-мусульман».
В первой половине 90-х СОР наравне с ИСИ выступила одним из создателей движения «Талибан» и вплоть до начала 2002-го поддерживала с ним довольно тесные контакты (в том числе через посла Саудовской Аравии в Исламабаде). Не менее активную деятельность СОР развернула через различные структуры, связанные с организацией «Братьев-мусульман», и при поддержке ИСИ в бывших советских республиках Средней Азии, в Грузии, Азербайджане и мусульманских регионах России. Согласно некоторым источникам, в данном случае также использовались саудовские дипломаты, в частности глава исламского отдела посольства в Москве Сулейман аль-Могоши и консул Абдалла аль-Хамиди.
В 2001 году СОР заметно сократила масштабы своей деятельности в России. В августе того же года, ровно за 11 дней до терактов в США, Турки аль-Фейсал покинул свой пост, а в июле 2002-го было объявлено о его новой должности — посла Саудовской Аравии в Лондоне. Вместо него СОР возглавил Наиф ибн Абд аль-Азиз, назначивший своим замом по оперативной части генерал-лейтенанта Махмуда бин-Мухаммада Бахша.
Наиф ибн Абд аль-Азиз — двадцатый сын основателя современного Саудовского королевства Абд аль-Азиза, брат наследного принца Абдаллы. Родился в 1934 году. Начал карьеру как губернатор Эр-Риада. Затем возглавил министерство финансов, а в 1970 году — МВД. В том же году вошел в состав так называемой семерки Судайри, определяющей внутреннюю и внешнюю политику королевства.
С начала 90-х уделяет большое внимание развитию связей с мусульманскими странами, в частности с монархиями Персидского залива, Пакистаном, Ираном и Палестиной. Возглавляет «Комиссию гуманитарной помощи интифаде Аль-Акса», оказывающей поддержку палестинскому исламистскому движению. В марте 2002 года, накануне 14-го саммита Лиги арабских государств, у него случился инсульт. Он был госпитализирован в больницу Американского университета в Бейруте. Сейчас Наиф ибн Абд аль-Азиз полностью вернулся к активной работе.
В текущем году Саудовская Аравия создала службу финансовой разведки для борьбы с финансированием терроризма. По словам экспертов, создание такой разведки (она будет собирать, анализировать финансовую информацию и обмениваться ею с зарубежными коллегами для отслеживания и борьбы с отмыванием денег и спонсированием террористов) — важнейший шаг, демонстрирующий приверженность королевства борьбе с отмыванием денег и терроризмом. Пока подобные подразделения имеются только в четырех арабских государствах: Египте, Ливане, Бахрейне и ОАЭ.
АЛЖИР
Президент Алжира Абдельазиз Бутефлика, избранный в 1999 году, в феврале 2000 года провел ряд перестановок в высшем армейском командовании: заменил командующих четырьмя из шести военных округов и поменял командование в Национальной жандармерии, военно-морском флоте, республиканской гвардии и в главном штабе сухопутных сил. На ключевые посты он выдвинул выпускников советских и французских военных вузов. Та же линия проводилась и в спецслужбах.
Сегодня алжирское разведовательное сообщество включает Управление разведки и безопасности, Управление внутренней безопасности, Управление документации и безопасности, Службу специальной безопасности, Командование по координации борьбы против повстанцев, Спецназ.
В июне 2002 года был сформирован новый кабинет министров Алжира, в котором пост министра МВД занял патриарх алжирских спецслужб 64-летний Нуриддин Язид Зерхуни. Он начал свою карьеру еще в 1956 году в рядах Фронта национального освобождения (ФНО) и принимал активное участие в сопротивлении французским колониальным властям. В 60 — 70-е годы он был одной из ключевых фигур в разведывательном сообществе страны. Его активность распространялась как на близлежащие страны Магриба и арабского Востока, так и на отдаленные районы африканского континента. При этом Зерхуни установил тесные связи с представителями спецслужб Египта, Кубы и ФРГ.
Пришедший к власти в 1979 году Шадли Бенджедид рассматривал Зерхуни как опасного соперника и поэтому в 1982-м отправил его послом в далекую Мексику. С 1987 по 1992 годы он возглавлял алжирское посольство в США. Вернувшись на родину, Зерхуни ушел на пенсию. Однако семь лет спустя новый президент Абдельазиз Бутефлика вновь призвал его на службу. Зерхуни стал одним из трех министров, перешедших из старого правительственного кабинета в новый. Его главная задача на посту шефа МВД — борьба с радикальными исламскими группировками и развитие связей со спецслужбами Магриба, Ближнего Востока и Европы.
Последние двадцать лет алжирские спецслужбы подвергались неоднократным и часто совершенно бессмысленным реформам. Их постоянно сливали, переименовывали и вновь разделяли. Конечно, на этот процесс в том числе влияла масштабная и в целом довольно неудачная борьба с исламскими экстремистами. В 1993 году она и привела Алжир к гражданской войне, многочисленным терактам, убийствам иностранных туристов и дипломатов.
ТУНИС
Тунис получил независимость в 1956 году. В марте того же года прошли выборы в Национальное собрание. Хабиб Бургиба сформировал свое первое правительство.
25 июля 1957 года была провозглашена республика. Президентом был избран Бургиба. 7 ноября 1987 года он был свергнут. В этот день в 7.30 утра из репродукторов раздался голос премьер-министра Туниса Зина аль-Абидина Бен-Али, объявившего о свержении Бугрибы и назначении самого себя президентом Туниса. По официальной версии, этим поступком Бен-Али сорвал угрозу путча, подготовленного фундаменталистами и назначенного на утро 8 ноября. Бен-Али остается президентом страны и сегодня.
В 2002 году тунисские спецслужбы активизировали свою деятельность в международных и региональных организациях в контексте борьбы с международным терроризмом. Президент Бен-Али поставил на первый план задачи по исключению условий для реанимации в Тунисе исламистского движения, способного дестабилизировать внутриполитическую ситуацию в стране. По оценке тунисского руководства, религиозный фанатизм является основной потенциальной угрозой стабильности и безопасности страны. Тунис присоединился к 11 из 12 универсальных конвенций в области сотрудничества в борьбе с международным терроризмом.
23 июля 2003 года министр внутренних дел и местного развития Хеди Мхенни заявил на заседании парламента, что за шесть месяцев 2003 года тунисским спецслужбам удалось предотвратить 66 попыток незаконной эмиграции из Туниса в европейские страны морским путем. При этом, сказал министр, из 1329 задержанных 70% составили граждане из соседних с Тунисом африканских государств и из стран Азии.
Тунисское спецслужбы решают и внутренние задачи. Они направлены на осуществление плотного контроля за исламистской оппозицией внутри страны и за ее пределами, пресечение любых проявлений зарождения каких-либо политических организаций на религиозной основе, недопущение проникновения на территорию страны экстремистских групп, оружия, взрывчатых веществ, фальшивых денежных знаков и наркотиков, задержание и экстрадицию преступников и подозреваемых в совершении опасных преступлений.
Благодаря взаимодействию со спецслужбами европейских (Бельгия, Италия) и арабских (Алжир) стран правоохранительным органам Туниса удалось вскрыть принадлежность 34 тунисцев к исламистской террористической группировке «Ахль аль-джамаа ва-с-Сунна», действовавшей на территории Италии в качестве структурного звена сети обеспечения и вербовки наемников для «Аль-Каиды».
Продолжаются контакты между спецслужбами Туниса и Бельгии в плане поиска лиц, входивших в состав связанной с «Аль-Каидой» так называемой «Тунисской исламской боевой группы». По данным представителей спецслужб, двое членов этой группы, выдавая себя за журналистов, в сентябре 2001 года совершили убийство лидера афганского Северного альянса Ахмеда Шах Масуда.
Сегодня разведывательное сообщество Туниса включает министерство внутренних дел и местного развития; Управление госбезопаности; Жандармерию; специальные органы при министерстве обороны.
МАРОККО
В 1999 году внезапно скончался король Хасан II. Освободившийся трон занял его 35-летний сын Сиди Мухамед (Мухаммед VI или, как его называют марокканцы, «М6»).
Первым делом новый король сменил шефа Службы контрразведки, назначив на этот пост полковника Хамиду Лаанигри. Кроме того, он уволил всемогущего при прежнем короле министра внутренних дел Дрисса Басри, заменив его Ахмедом Мидауи. Монарх также создал новый пост Государственного секретаря по внутренним делам, назначив на него личного друга нового министра МВД Фуада Али эль-Химму.
По сведениям эксперта по спецслужбам Андрея Солдатова, несколько лет назад по инициативе короля состоялись две тайные встречи представителей спецслужб и МИДа Марокко с их израильскими коллегами. В ходе переговоров обсуждались вопросы возобновления двустороннего сотрудничества в области безопасности, в частности в борьбе с исламистскими организациями, а также перспектива активизации посреднических усилий Рабата в израильско-палестинском конфликте.
Инициатива возобновить диалог с Израилем, прерванный в результате «интифады Аль-Акса», также принадлежала Мохаммеду VI. Одновременно значительно активизировалось сотрудничество марокканских спецслужб с МВД и Службой общей разведки Саудовской Аравии.
ЛИВИЯ
Сегодня в распоряжении полковника Муамара Каддафи две спецслужбы. Это — военная разведка («Истихбарат аль-Аскария») и Секретная организация Джамахирии («Хаят Амн аль-Джамахирия») — ливийский аналог КГБ.
С декабря 2002 года военной разведкой руководит Абдалла Санусси. Секретную организацию Джамахирии возглавляет Муса Куса, находящийся в ранге заместителя министра иностранных дел, который отличился в деле Локерби. Кроме того, Муса Куса возглавляет так называемый Антиимпериалистический центр, используемый для поддержки террористов. Второй человек в Секретной организации — Сулейман Ашири.
Внутреннюю безопасность возглавляет министр юстиции и общественной безопасности Мухаммед Али аль-Мисрати.
Функции по поддержанию порядка осуществляют батальоны безопасности («Катаиб аль-Амн») Они расположены во всех крупных ливийских городах.
Каддафи не стесняется расставлять на ключевые посты в спецслужбах людей, которые в европейских странах обвиняются в терроризме. Например, Абдаллу Санусси в 1999 году во Франции заочно приговорили к пожизненной каторге за организацию взрыва на борту гражданского авиалайнера ДС-10. Но это не помешало ливийскому лидеру назначить его шефом военной разведки, тем более что до этого он руководил Секретной организацией Джамахирии.
КАТАР
За обеспечение государственной безопасности в Катаре отвечают три структуры: Полиция расследований («Мухабарат»), Управление расследований госбезопасности («Мабахис») и военная разведка («Мухабарат аль-Аскария»).
Полиция расследований входит в состав министерства внутренних дел. В задачу Управления расследований госбезопасности входит борьба со шпионажем. Основной задачей военной разведки является обеспечение безопасности вооруженных сил Катара. Она также отвечает за борьбу с терроризмом и политическими диссидентами.
Катарский закон предусматривает лишь два сценария развития событий для лиц, обвиненных в шпионаже: смертную казнь или полное оправдание.
Спецслужбы Катара поддерживают достаточно тесные контакты с разведсообществом Израиля.
* * *
Вот уже почти 60 лет Израиль остается главным объектом интересов арабских секретных служб. Их интересуют структуры различных партий, расстановка политических сил в стране, планы правительства, вооруженные силы, военная доктрина, экономика, сотрудничество с иностранными государствами, отношения с еврейской диаспорой, сионистские организации и т.д.
Не меньший интерес, чем «сионистский враг», для арабских спецслужб представляют… арабские государства. Это является частью того, что называется «арабской холодной войной», которая нередко перерастала в «горячую», — в Йемене, Ливане, Марокко и Алжире. Усилия, прилагаемые некоторыми арабскими секретными службами для свержения режима в «братской» стране, никогда не ослабевали и даже превосходили по активности деятельность, направленную против Израиля.
Одним из основных источников информации для арабских спецслужб служит поток сообщений, публикуемых иностранными СМИ. Но этой информации явно недостаточно. Поэтому «мухабарат», стремясь поднять сбор разведданных на более высокий уровень, создают «базы» за границей, иногда далеко от Ближнего Востока. Эти «базы» не только позволяют выявлять агентов, работающих на Израиль, но и одновременно дают возможность для получения информации как о еврейском государстве, так и об арабских странах.
К.А. Капитонов
Источник - https://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/22-11-05b.htm
