Double agents

[ИнфоПоиск]

A person who is used by two or more intelligence services and who supplies one or more of them with disinformation is called a “double agent”. He may be in this position intentionally or involuntarily. The first CIA director, Allen Dulles, in his book The Art of Intelligence, dedicated a separate chapter to double agents. It begins like this: “In the annals of espionage, a double agent plays a special role. His services are paid simultaneously by two different, in most cases hostile, secret services, but he spies on both one and the other side, even if it is his own homeland. In the end, he often begins to work only for one owner, leading by the nose of another. " Other definitions of the concept of “double agent” can be given, but none of them fully reflects all the nuances of this complex technology of the secret war.

The story about the basic techniques for using dual agents will begin with terminology. So, the word "agent" means not only a person who performs intelligence tasks, but also her staff member. The term "counterintelligence" means the enemy’s intelligence services that counteract intelligence. And the phrase “double agent” is a person who provides services to two or more warring special services. The case when the agent is manipulated by counterintelligence, but he does not know about it, we will call "use in vain."
The abstract scheme for transforming an ordinary agent into a “double” can be described by a simple formula. In the process of completing the reconnaissance mission, the agent interacted with the enemy’s counterintelligence, as a result of which he began to carry out its tasks. In other words, now he has not one, but two owners.
In life, everything is more complicated. We will talk about the basic techniques of using double agents on the fronts of the secret war. The names of all categories of doubles, except for one, “moles,” are not generally accepted and serve only to simplify the presentation of the material.

"Dealer"

Information is a product. It can be stolen, bought or exchanged for other information. Sometimes agents make various trade manipulations with her. For example, in the late 30s in Japan, the legendary Soviet military intelligence officer Richard Sorge exchanged confidential information with employees of the German embassy who performed tasks of German intelligence. He also received important information from them. At the same time, the Germans did not know that Sorge was a secret informant of Moscow. For them, he was just a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper and the German Information Bureau in Tokyo, whose analytical skills were significantly higher than most politicians and diplomats. In October 1941, Sorge was arrested by Japanese counterintelligence. Tokyo offered Moscow to exchange it for Japanese citizens who were imprisoned in the USSR, but Joseph Stalin refused. One of the reasons - in Moscow, it was suspected that Sorge had become a double agent and secretly collaborated with Berlin. In fact, he never betrayed the Soviet Union, but this became known only after the end of the war. Richard Sorge was sentenced to death in September 1943 and hanged in a Tokyo prison on November 7, 1944.
What is the danger of a "merchant" for intelligence? There is always a risk that in the course of his “commercial” activities he will begin to supply counterintelligence with more information than he receives from it. Another danger for intelligence - the "merchant" almost always acts independently, without control from the Center. There is always the risk that the “merchant” will try to use the enemy’s blind counterintelligence to convey misinformation.
The "merchant" has an important advantage over other categories of double agents. He is less likely to fail, because sometimes it’s very important for the enemy that the information exchange system exists for as long as possible.

"Sent Cossack"

The agent offers its services to counterintelligence of the enemy on the initiative of intelligence. Moreover, he clearly follows all the instructions of the Center. Sometimes this technique is used to collect information about enemy reconnaissance structures. For example, a “mishandled Cossack” can find out who and how organizes work with agents at the enemy, find out what issues counterintelligence is interested in, etc.
What dangers await such an agent? The risk of exposure with all the ensuing consequences. Also, the adversary may try to flip it or, as in the previous case, use the blind in their own interests.

"Mole"

“Mole” is a personnel intelligence officer working for counterintelligence of the enemy. The reasons why a person decided to change his homeland can be any. For example, the desire to earn more money or to avoid punishment for misconduct. During the Cold War, US intelligence agencies had two popular options for organizing a "mousetrap" for Soviet intelligence personnel: sexual and commercial.
In the first version - it is often called the "honey trap" - the victim was seduced by the sent beauty. Bed comforts were secretly filmed on photos and videos, and then shown to an agent with the words: “Either you cooperate with us, or your superiors in Moscow will receive these pornographic pictures.” For a KGB or GRU officer, a documented intimate relationship with a foreign intelligence agent (in Moscow they will immediately figure out who organized the photo shoot) meant at least a recall to his homeland, the end of his career and the status of “travel abroad” for the rest of his life. Although it could be worse. For example, expulsion from the profession with shame.
In the second version, a potential double agent was caught on a dubious commercial operation, most often petty speculation or an attempt to borrow from a foreign intelligence officer (for example, to cover the embezzlement of public money). If this episode in the agent’s life became known to Moscow, its consequences would be similar to the payback for sexual adventures.
The myth wanders that during the Cold War, most moles began to cooperate with foreign intelligence exclusively for ideological reasons, thus fighting the totalitarian regime that they hated. In life, everything was simpler and more cynical. The staff members of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (foreign intelligence) and the GRU most often cheated on their homeland for the sake of their own material well-being and career growth.
“Mole” is dangerous in that it informs the enemy’s counterintelligence of detailed information about personnel officers and intelligence agents, its working methods and individual operations. In addition, he can act in the interests of foreign intelligence and participate in disinformation operations. For example, to actively disseminate misinformation from double agents and to hush up information received from agents loyal to intelligence.
What dangers await the "mole"? Firstly, in time to not feel the increased interest in your person from the counterintelligence units and not have time to escape from the country. Secondly, even if after the “failure” he agrees to cooperate with the investigation, this will not save him from years of imprisonment or death penalty.

"Falsehood"

The main thing that distinguishes the “false mole” from the “mole” is that it offers its services or allows you to recruit yourself (for example, deliberately falls into the “honey trap”) on the instructions of intelligence. In all other respects, except for transmitting misinformation, it acts like an ordinary mole.
This technique is used extremely rarely. The main reason - it is very difficult to prepare a huge amount of false information and at the same time not cause suspicion from the enemy. You also need to consider many nuances. For example, in March 1986, a KGB officer - let's call him "Mr. X" - suggested to the CIA that it would report on money about certain Soviet intelligence operations. The Americans accepted his offer and regularly paid fees. In one of the reports, Mr. X accused the CIA officer Charles Leuven, who had previously maintained contact with the “mole”, an employee of the KGB Bonn residency, Major Gennady Varenik (aka Fitness), in misappropriating part of the money intended to pay for the services of a traitor. After that, the Americans realized that Mr. X was a “false moth.” The CIA refused to believe that their employee, who was respected in the Office, could commit theft of public money.
There are examples of the successful use of "false moles". In 1987, an employee of the American department of the Second Main Directorate (counterintelligence) of the KGB, Alexander Zhomov ("Prologue") offered his services to Moscow CIA resident Jack Downing. The Americans believed him. Until July 1990, until the CIA tried to secretly smuggle him to the United States for a thorough check, including and using a “lie detector,” he actively supplied misinformation. It is clear that the KGB leadership was against such a trip, and the security officer himself seriously risked, so they decided to stop the operation on Lubyanka.

"Changeling"

We call a “changeling” an agent who, for one reason or another, has agreed to cooperate with the enemy’s counterintelligence. Most often, a person makes such a decision in order to avoid punishment. Not necessarily many years in prison for espionage, which he was promised by counterintelligence officers. There are other remedies. For example, drug possession in some countries is subject to very severe penalties. Counterintelligence agents can always toss them to an agent, although professionals do this extremely rarely. In most cases, an agent recruited in this way will try to avenge counterintelligence, and effective work should not be expected from it. Therefore, aerobatics in counterintelligence is to force the agent himself to decide that he will now work for the new owner.

"Radiofreated Changeling"

This type of double agent existed only during the Second World War and the Cold War. The main difference from the “shifters” is the presence of a portable radio station for communication with the Center. To date, in connection with the development of the Internet and other means of communication, this category of dual agents has disappeared as unnecessary.
Why did we rank double agents with radio stations in a separate category? During the Second World War and the first decade of the Cold War, they inflicted significantly more damage to their former owners than their non-radio-infected colleagues.
"Achilles Heel" of intelligence - the organization of a reliable communication channel between the intelligence officer and the Center. If there is no such channel, then the agent’s efficiency in the extraction of classified information is minimal. On the one hand, the Center does not receive information obtained by the agent, on the other hand, it cannot tell the intelligence officer what exactly he is interested in right now. In this situation, radio communication is the best option.
If counterintelligence agents are able to recycle a radioactive agent, the enemy will be able to transmit misinformation - answers to his questions. You can still create a mythical intelligence network and ask to send agents to ensure its successful functioning - radio operators and residents. It is clear that the ambassadors of the Center will fall into an ambush organized by counterintelligence. You can also try to turn them into double agents. Operational events with the participation of “radio-modified shifters” are called radio games.
In the operational correspondence of the Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War, radio games were designated as events under the letter "E". During this time, they were carried out 193. Moreover, some of them involved the radioficated dual agents of the enemy. The maximum number of radio stations involved in one Wehrmacht disinformation operation is 24. These are at least 24 enemy radio operators who have been recruited and several residents. The operation was carried out in the winter of 1944-1945 with the aim of convincing Berlin that the Red Army was in prolonged "winter hibernation", and that the offensive had been postponed to the spring of 1945. The enemy believed and launched an offensive in the Ardennes on the Western Front. Therefore, the blitzkrieg of the Red Army in Poland, which went down in history as the Wisło-Oder operation - during which from January 12 to February 1, 1945, troops advanced 500 kilometers in a straight line, breaking seven lines (!) Of the enemy's deeply echeloned defense - was successful .
Not always a radio game guaranteed victory to its organizer. If the enemy suspected that the radio operators had become double agents, he began his counterplay. And often won. An example is the North Pole radio game (summer of 1942 - 1944). Until the summer of 1945 in Berlin, this operation was considered one of the most successful. With the help of 21 double agents, the German intelligence services controlled the British-Dutch intelligence network in the Netherlands. The Germans managed to capture and recruit three emissaries who arrived from London, 18 local agents-radio operators, to capture a huge amount of weapons and ammunition dropped by parachutes. And, most importantly, in Berlin, they were sure that the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition would land on the North Sea coast in the Netherlands, and not France. After all, it was not in vain that London demanded double agents to provide detailed information about the troops of the Third Reich stationed in the area.


Double agents are able to leave in the centuries-old chronicle of the “secret war” a brighter and more noticeable trace than their “ordinary” colleagues.
Sometimes their merits are doubtful, but sometimes they play a key role in one or another important event in world history.

[DLMURL] https://www.razvedinfo.ru/content/dubl [/DLMURL]

 

[Матушкин Андрей Николаевич]

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